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The Uniform Arbitration Act
I. SECTION 1: VALIDITY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Many states have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act' and retain a strong
preference for resolving disputes through arbitration. As a result of this strong
preference, doubts regarding arbitration agreements are generally resolved in favor
of arbitration. However, favoritism toward arbitration is sometimes curbed by the
fact that most courts hold that an agreement to arbitrate is a contract and subject to
the same limitations and privileges imposed on other agreements. This pattern of
courts applying contract law to arbitration agreements is consistent with Section 1
of the UAA, which states that an arbitration agreement is valid, enforceable, and
irrevocable so long as it does not violate the laws of contract.2
A. Scope of the Arbitration Agreement
In Breaker v. Corrosion Control Corp.,3 the Colorado Court of Appeals decided
several issues relating to the validity of an arbitration clause contained in a purchase
agreement.4 The plaintiff was the primary stockholder of Elizamy, a business that
designed, manufactured, and distributed flanges and other gaskets.' Elizamy and the
plaintiff entered into a purchase agreement with the defendants pursuant to which
Elizamy agreed to transfer all of its assets to defendants. 6 The purchase agreement
contained an arbitration clause,7 and obligated defendants to enter into an
employment agreement with the plaintiff." After the purchase agreement was
executed, the plaintiff and defendants entered into an employment agreement that
did not contain an express provision for arbitration.9 Rather, it provided that all
1. U.A.A.
2. U.A.A. § 1 (1997).
3. Breaker v. Corrosion Control Corp., 23 P.3d 1278 (Colo. App. 2001).
4. Id. at 1281-82.
5. Id. at 1281.
6. Id. The plaintiff was made a party to the agreement to reflect that he had personally made certain
representations and warranties to the defendant and to bind him to certain obligations respecting future
receipt by Elizamy or by him of capital stock in defendants. Id.
7. The arbitration clause provided that "[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this
Agreement, or breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration." Id. In addition, the purchase agreement
did not include any express agreement not to disclose information respecting Elizamy's or defendants'
business to other parties. Id.
8. Id. The employment agreement was substantially in the same form as a document attached to the
purchase agreement. Id. Unlike the purchase agreement, the employment agreement expressly stated
that information relative to business or affairs of the defendant were not to be disclosed. Id.
9. Id.
1
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claims "arising out of, in connection with, or by reason" of the employment
agreement were to be governed by Colorado law and resolved in court.'0 In addition,
the employment agreement contained a provision stating that the terms constituted
a complete agreement between the parties and superseded all other agreements
between the parties. " Two years later, the defendants, plaintiff, and Elizamy entered
into an additional agreement that made no express reference to arbitration, instead
stating that "exclusive jurisdiction and venue for any action brought under this
agreement would be the District Court of Denver County, Colorado."' 2
The plaintiff brought this action alleging the employment agreement was
breached because the defendants failed to pay him royalties due.'3 In his complaint,
the plaintiff placed no reliance on the purchase agreement, and mentioned it only
with respect to the employment agreement as a condition of the sale of Elizamy's
assets. 14 Likewise, the defendants did not rely upon any provision of the purchase
agreement in their initial responsive pleading and later counterclaims.5
Subsequent to defendants filing additional counterclaims, the plaintiff and
counterclaim defendants sought to arbitrate the claims arising under and related to
the purchase agreement.' 6 The trial court denied the plaintiff's request, holding that
the arbitration provision was broad enough to cover any claims arising under the
employment agreement, but that the plaintiff had waived his right to arbitrate by
failing to raise the issue sooner.' 7 The plaintiff argued that the arbitration provisions
of the purchase agreement did not extend to issues implicating only the employment
agreement.' The plaintiff based his argument on the fact that the parties in their
initial pleadings implicated no factual or legal issues that arose under the purchase
agreement, and that the court erred in determining that the plaintiff waived his right
to demand arbitration for those issues pertaining to the purchase agreement.' 9
In determining whether the plaintiff waived his right to arbitrate, the court had
to determine whether the arbitration clause in the purchase agreement extended to
disputes arising out of the employment agreement.2' The determination was
necessary because the parties' initial claims, counterclaims, discovery, and the
activities that resulted in waiver implicated only issues involving the employment
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. Under this new agreement, defendant consented to plaintiff's employment by another party;
plaintiff's nondisclosure obligation created by the employment agreement was reaffirmed; and Elizamy




15. Id. at 1282. Defendant filed a counterclaim asserting that the plaintiff violated the original
employment agreement and the later agreement by disclosing confidential information to a third party,
and that the plaintiff had improperly interfered with an advantageous business relationship that defendant
had developed with the same third party. d.
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agreement.2 In reaching its conclusion, the court recognized the strong public
policy for arbitration, but refused to ignore the fact that arbitration agreements are
subject to contract law.22 Contract law dictates that the parties' reasonable
expectations must determine an arbitration obligation's reach.23 In the instant case,
the parties' reasonable expectation was evidenced by the following: (1) the
employment agreement made no reference to arbitration, and the purchase agreement
mandated arbitration for actions arising out of this agreement; (2) the employment
agreement did not incorporate any terms of the purchase agreement but instead,
indicated that it was the "complete agreement"; (3) the subjects covered by the
agreements were different; and (4) the fact that the parties could have expressed the
two agreements under a single contract but opted not to.24 In addition, the court
stated that the parties' intention was confmned by their actions in the litigation.2"
Accordingly, the court held that a "claim or counterclaim that implicates only
the employment agreement is not arbitrable and that plaintiff's participation in
litigation of such claims could not, as a matter or law, constitute a knowing waiver
of his right to require arbitration of other claims that arise out of or relate to the
purchase agreement. '
The court then had to determine which counterclaims implicated the rights and
obligations under the purchase agreement, and concluded that all claims that did
implicate such rights and obligations were arbitrable. 27 The defendants argued that
the intertwining doctrine prevents arbitration. 2' The court disagreed, and found that
because the intertwining doctrine is to be applied only if there are common issues
between arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims, the doctrine did not apply to this case
because there were no such common issues.29
In Sullivan v. Sears Authorized Termite and Pest Control, Inc.,3" the Florida
Court of Appeals considered whether tort claims that are unrelated to the
performance of a contract fell within the scope of the arbitration clause contained in
21. Id. at 1283.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1283-84.
25. Id. at 1284. The court is pointing to the fact that during the initial pleadings, neither party
mentioned or relied on the purchase agreement. It was not until the additional parties and counterclaims
were introduced, did the plaintiff attempt to assert his right to arbitrate the claims stemming from the
purchase agreement. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1284-85. The defendants claimed that (1) plaintiff and Elizamy made misrepresentations
and fraudulent disclosure of patent rights transferred to defendant, (2) that plaintiff and Elizamy
disclosed confidential information to third parties, (3) plaintiff had tortuously interfered with various
third parties. Id.
28. Id. The intertwining doctrine, it is argued, states that even if some counterclaims are arbitrable
and the right to arbitrate has not been waived, because they are joined with claims that are related but
not arbitrable, none of the claims are arbitrable. The plaintiffs argued that the agreement is governed
by the Federal Arbitration Act ("F.A.A.") because it deals with a transaction in interstate commerce, and
the F.A.A. precludes application of the intertwining doctrine to deny enforcement of a contractual right
to arbitrate. The defendants argues that F.A.A. does not govern the contract because of the specific
reference to the U.A.A.. Id.
29. Id. at 1286.
30. 780 S.2d 996 (Fla. Dist. App. 2001), rev'd, 816 S.2d 603 (Fla. 2002).
2002]
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the contract. 3' Sears and Sullivan executed a Pest Control Agreement in which Sears
agreed to provide exterminating services for various pests, including spiders.32 The
agreement contained an arbitration provision.33 After Sears treated Sullivan's
residence, Sullivan was bitten by a spider.34 Consequently, Sullivan sued, arguing
that the arbitration provision did not preclude her action because the agreement was
silent as to the parties' intent to arbitrate personal injury or tort claims.3" The court
turned to Seiferts v. U.S. Home Corp.,36 where the Florida Supreme Court held that
actions sounding in tort were not within the scope of the arbitration agreements
because the claims were unrelated to the performance of the contract. 7 In the
present case, the Sullivan court used the same reasoning in holding that Sullivan's
action did not fall within the scope of the arbitration clause of the agreement.3' The
Florida District Court of Appeals found that: (1) the claim was predicated upon a tort
theory; (2) the dispute was not significantly related to the contract since none of
plaintiff's allegations referred to or mentioned the sales agreement; and (3) there was
nothing in the Pest Control Agreement to indicate that either party intended to
include tort claims within the scope of the agreement.39
In D&E Constr. Co., Inc. v. Robert J. Denley Co., Inc.,' D&E Construction
submitted for arbitration a contractual payment dispute with Denley arising out of
a contract to build a subdivision.41 The arbitrators found in favor of D&E
Construction and awarded attorney's fees.42 The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld
the trial court's verdict, holding that arbitrators exceed their authority by awarding
attorney's fees upon matters not within the scope of the contract's arbitration
provision.43 The scope of the arbitrator's authority is thus determined by the terms
of the agreement between the parties, which includes the agreement of the parties to
arbitrate the dispute."
The court agreed with D&E Construction that the language of the agreement
gave the arbitrator broad authority, but that authority related to deciding any claim
covered by the contract.45 The D&E Construction court also applied the canon of
31. Id. at 998.
32. Id. at 997.
33. Id. The arbitration provision requires arbitration of claims "arising out of or relating to the
interpretation, performance or breach of any provision of this agreement." Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 998. Sullivan sued Sears for negligence, breach of implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud
in the inducement. To buttress her argument, Sullivan contends that because Sears drafted the
agreement, it should be construed against Sears. Id. at 997-98.
36. 750 S.2d 633 (Fla. 1999).
37. Sullivan, 780 S.2d at 1000-01.
38. Id. at 1001.
39. Id.
40. 38 S.W.3d 513 (Tenn. 2001).
41. Id. at 514.
42. Id. Although neither party requested attorney's fees in their written submissions for relief, it is
undisputed that D&E Construction orally notified Denley prior to arbitration that it would be seeking
attorney's fees. Id. at 515.
43. Id. at 514-15.
44. Id. at 518.
45. Id. at 519.
[Vol. 2002, No. 2
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"expressio unius est exclusio alterius"4 6 in determining that if the parties intended to
include attorney's fees within the scope of the arbitration clause, they would have
done so as they did with the indemnification clause in the contract.47 Furthermore,
the court reasoned that the broad nature of the arbitration provision was limited by
applicable Tennessee law, as evidenced by the inclusion of a choice-of-law
provision.4 Accordingly, the court held that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in
awarding attorney's fees, and vacating the attorney's fee award did not vacate the
entire arbitration award.49
B. Allegations of Fraud in the Inducement
There currently is a split among courts whether an arbitration agreement is
nonexistent if the contract containing the arbitration agreement was fraudulently
induced, even if the arbitration agreement itself was not. The majority view is
outlined in Burden v. Check Into Cash of Kentucky.50 In Burden, the plaintiffs
entered into a "check cashing agreement" that contained an arbitration clause 5' with
the defendants. 2 The "check cashing agreement" provided that the defendants
would provide the plaintiffs with cash in exchange for a check in the same amount
plus a "finance charge."53 The agreement also provided that the defendants would
hold the check for two weeks, which was the normal payment due date. 4 If after
two weeks the borrower lacked sufficient funds to cover the check, the defendants
would allow the borrower to "roll-over" the debt.55
The plaintiffs brought an action alleging that the defendants loaned money at
usurious interest rates to hundreds of Kentucky residents.56 The defendants
responded by filing a motion with the trial court under the Federal Arbitration Act




49. Id. at 520-21.
50. 267 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2001).
51. The arbitration clause stated that "(t]o pursue any claim, demand, dispute, or cause of action (a
"claim") arising under this Agreement or the transaction in connection with which this Agreement has
been executed, the claimant must submit to the other party in writing an explanation of the claim." If
the party does not respond within ten days, then the claimant may decide whether to have the claim
resolved in court or by an arbitrator. If the party does respond within ten days, then it must be decided
by-an arbitrator. Id. at 487.
52. Id. at 486.
53. Id. For example, the defendants would provide the borrower with $200 in cash in exchange for
a check in the amount of $238, the $38 would be the "finance charge." The "check cashing agreement"
indicated that the "finance charge" was a service fee and not interest. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 486. "Rolling-over" one's debt means that the borrower has to pay an additional "service
fee," receives a replacement check in the same amount as the original check, and is required to pay the
loan back within the normal two week period. Theses terms result in annual percentage rates of over
five-hundred percent. Id.
56. ld. Kentucky law provides that check cashing companies that charge a "service fee" for accepting
and deferring deposit on checks pursuant to agreements constitute interest subject to its usury laws. Id.
(citing Ky. Rev. Stat. § 368 et seq. (2001))
5
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("FAA") 7 to compel arbitration of the claims brought by the plaintiffs, which was
subsequently denied."' It is from that order that the defendants brought this appeal.3 9
The plaintiffs contend that their initial "check cashing agreement" did not contain
an arbitration clause, and they were not made aware of the added arbitration clause
until it was attached to the defendant's motion to compel arbitration.60
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted the majority
rule articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Prima Paint v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co.,61 which held that a court may adjudicate claims of fraud in the
inducement only if the claim of fraud concerns the inducement of the arbitration
clause itself, and not the inducement of the contract generally. 2 For a complaint of
fraud in the inducement to survive the Prima Paint rule, the complaint must contain
a well-founded claim of fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause standing
apart from the whole agreement, that would provide grounds for the revocation of
the agreement to arbitrate.63 Because parties to a contract are presumed to know its
contents, the plaintiffs' contention that they were unaware of the arbitration clause
did not persuade the court to find any fraud in the inducement.'
In the alternative, plaintiffs attacked the enforceability of the arbitration clause
itself, arguing that as unsophisticated consumers of limited education and means, the
arbitration agreement should not be enforced.65 Subsequently, the court remanded
the plaintiffs' allegations that the arbitration agreements, separate from the loan
agreement, were not enforceable against them on the "grounds as exist at law or in
equity for revocation of any contract."6
The minority view on fraud in the inducement as applied to arbitration clauses
is outlined in Marks v. Bean.6 7 The Markses sold their home to the Beans pursuant
to a contract that contained an arbitration provision.68 However, after the Beans took
57. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2001).
58. Burden, 267 F.3d at 486.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 487.
61. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). Applying Prima Paint, the Burden court made a distinction between
contracts executed fraudulently as being void and contracts induced fraudulently as voidable. Burden,
267 F.3d at 488-489. In C.B.S. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Donaldson, Lujkin & Jenrette Sec.
Corp., 912 F.2d 1563 (6th Cir. 1990), the court discounted that distinction and characterized the central
issue as whether the claim of fraud relates to the making of the arbitration agreement. Burden, 267 F.3d
at 489 (citing C.B.S. Employees, 912 F.2d at 1566).
62. Burden, 267 F.3d at 488. In Prima Paint, the court found that the arbitration clauses were
"separable" from the contracts in which they were included, and that "broad arbitration clause will be
held to encompass arbitration of the claim that the contract itself was induced from fraud." Id. (quoting
Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402).
63. Burden, 267 F.3d at 491. In addition, the court discussed the decision in Three Valleys Mun.
Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 925 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1991), which is the case that the district
courtrelied on in denying defendants' motion to compel arbitration. Burden, 267 F.3d at 491. However,
the court found that Three Valleys' line of reasoning was not applicable to the present case because
Burden challenged the substance, rather than the existence, of the loan agreements. Id. at 490.
64. Id. at 491-92.
65. Id. at 492. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that arbitration would impose burdensome costs,
deny statutory rights, and constitute an uninformed waiver of jury trial. Id.
66. Id.
67. 57 S.W.3d 303 (Ky. App. 2001).
68. Id. at 304. The contract contained a disclosure form that stated that there were no "defects or
problems, current or past, to the structure [of the home] or exterior veneer." Id.
[Vol. 2002, No. 2
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possession, they discovered serious problems with the brick veneer and filed suit
against the Markses alleging that they were fraudulently induced to enter into the
contract. 69 The Markses responded by moving to compel arbitration, which the trial
court denied. 70 The Beans successfully offered two theories challenging the validity
of the arbitration clause: (1) the merger doctrine,7' and (2) that the arbitration clause
was not enforceable pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 417.050.72
Although the majority of jurisdictions follow the separability doctrine, which
invalidates arbitration clauses only when allegations of fraud are specific to the
arbitration clause,73 the Marks court was persuaded by the minority view.74 The
Kentucky Court of Appeals stated that the separability doctrine disproportionately
elevated the policy favoring arbitration over the strong public policy against fraud.75
Furthermore, the court deferred to the legislature's intent that innocent parties should
not be forced to comply with arbitration provisions in contracts tainted with fraud.76
Accordingly, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the arbitration clause was
precluded by the public policy exception that protects parties from fraudulent
inducement even if the fraud only went to the underlying contract.77
Courts have also addressed the issue of fraud in the inducement as it applies to
confidential relationships. In Paone v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,s Paone, whose
mother had died and left him an inheritance, went to Dean Witter to invest the
money and signed several agreements, some of which contained agreements to
arbitrate any disputes arising out of the relationship. 79  After Dean Witter
fraudulently handled his funds, Paone filed a complaint against Dean Witter.s° Dean
Witter responded by moving to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause
contained in the Active Assets Account Agreement and the Calls and Options
Agreement."' The trial court denied Dean Witter's demand for arbitration, holding
that Paone did not sign the Active Assets Account Agreement containing the
arbitration clause, and that the Calls and Option Agreement did not contain an
arbitration provision. 2 Moreover, the trial court concluded that both agreements
were unenforceable because they were induced by fraud.s3
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 305. The plaintiffs successfully argued that the merger doctrine invalidated the arbitration
clause because the clause did not survive the closing since it was not contained in the deed of
conveyance. Id.
72. Id. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 417.050 (2001) is a section of the Kentucky Uniform Arbitration Act. Id. at
304.
73. Burden, 267 F.3d 483.
74. Marks, 57 S.W.3d at 306-07.
75. Id. at 307.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 308. In addition, the Markses argued that under the court's interpretation of K.U.A.A., Ky.
Rev. Stat. § 417.050 as enacted in Kentucky, the Beans would not be entitled to litigate their fraud claim
since they had not sought recission of the contract. However, the court disagreed and found that the
statute allowed the allegation of the existence of grounds for revocation to suffice. Id. at 307.
78. 789 A.2d 221 (Pa. Super. 2001).
79. Id. at 223.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 223-24.
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On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals determined that the Calls and Option
Agreement did contain an arbitration clause. 4 Dean Witter argued that the attack on
the validity of the contract for fraud did not invalidate the arbitration clause."5 The
arbitration clause, Dean Witter argued, was only invalid if the fraud went specifically
to the arbitration provision. 6 Paone responded to Dean Witter's argument by
asserting that a fiduciary duty arose out of the investment relationship which made
the contract and the arbitration clause voidable. 7 The Paone court held that in
determining the validity of an arbitration agreement contained in a contract that was
a product of a confidential relationship, the trial court must determine: (1) whether
a confidential relationship existed; (2) whether the proponent of the arbitration
provision met its burden of showing the provision was fair under the circumstances;
and (3) that the provision was not a result of a violation of the trust reposed in the
confidential relationship.8
C. The Interplay Between Arbitration Clauses and the Magnuson-Moss
Act
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Acte9 applies to warranties contained in
consumer products and services contracts.90 "The Act provides that a consumer who
is damaged by the failure of a warrantor to comply with the obligations imposed by
the [warrantor]. . .may bring suit for damages and other relief."9' Although the Act
does not specifically prohibit arbitration, some courts have reached the conclusion
that consumers always retain the right to access to courts. 92
In Philyaw v. Platinum Enterprises, Inc.,93 the court came to the same
conclusion when it was asked to address the issue of whether the Magnuson-Moss
Act precluded arbitration pursuant to the parties' written warranty agreement
containing an arbitration clause.94 The plaintiffs purchased a used vehicle from the
defendants, and in connection with the sales transaction, a vehicle service contract
was issued.95 The plaintiffs subsequently experienced problems with their vehicle
and Platinum's repair efforts were inadequate to cure the defects.96 Thereafter, the
plaintiffs filed an action alleging "that (Platinum] breached the warranties
[contained] in the vehicle service contract and violated the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act."97 In response, defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration, which




88. Id. at 227.
89. 15 U.S.C. §2301 et seq. (2000).
90. Philyaw v. Platinum Enterprises, Inc., 2001 WL 112107 at *2 (Va. Cir. Jan. 9,2001).
91. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at *1.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at *"1-2.
(Vol. 2002, No. 2
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the court denied.9 ' The court agreed with the plaintiffs that the Magnuson-Moss Act
precluded agreements to arbitrate."
D. Arbitration Agreements and Forum Selection Clauses
In Internet East, Inc. v. Duro Commun., Inc.,' 00 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals decided whether a forum selection clause contained in a license agreement
invalidated an arbitration provision found in the same agreement.' ' The plaintiffs
"entered into a pre-incorporation agreement [where] they agreed to form .. .
'Internet East, Inc."" 0 2 As part of setting up the company, the plaintiffs executed a
license agreement with Internet of Greenville, Inc., that contained an arbitration
clause and a forum selection clause. 3 The defendants, "an internet subscriber and
network access business, acquired the assets of Internet of Greenville, Inc. and
assumed the assignment of the license agreement.""' 4 Prior to acquiring Internet of
Greenville, defendants purchased CoastalNet, another internet subscriber
company.105
Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants arguing that when defendants acquired
CoastalNet, it became a competitor of Internet East, Inc., thereby violating the ban
against competition contained in the license agreement inherited from the Internet
of Greenville transaction."° The defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration,
which the trial court denied because the forum selection clause nullified the
arbitration provision."7 As a result, the court found that the license agreement did
not contain a valid arbitration agreement.0 On appeal, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that the trial court erred in allowing the plaintiffs' motion to stay
arbitration, incorrectly reading the arbitration clause in the license agreement as
permissive and non-mandatory.'9
Arbitration agreements are subject to the laws of contract, and for that reason
"[w]here the terms of a contractual agreement are clear and unambiguous, the courts
cannot rewrite the plain meaning of the contract."'' 0 In this case, the arbitration
98. Id. at *1.
99. Id. at *2.
100. 553 S.E.2d 84 (N.C. App. 2001).
101. Id. at 87.
102. Id. at 85.
103. Id. According to the license agreement, plaintiffs licenced from Internet of Greenville, Inc. "the
entire right, title, and interest in and to the trade name and other related proprietary marks..." In addition,
the license agreement stated that plaintiffs wished to obtain a license from Internet of Greenville for the
purpose of operating an Internet access, electronic mail, and personal web page services business within
a defined and limited territory. Id.




108. Id. The trial court concluded that the language of the arbitration and forum clauses were in
conflict and that the language of the arbitration agreement which read, "'[u]nless the parties shall agree
otherwise' demonstrates the parties' intent to render the otherwise mandatory language of [the arbitration
clause in] the license agreement permissive and non-mandatory." Id.
109. Id. at 86-87.
110. Id. at 87 (quoting Montgomery v. Montgomery, 429 SE.2d 438. 441 (N.C. App. 1993).
2002]
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agreement's plain meaning was that all claims were to be arbitrated unless there was
an agreement to the contrary. The court determined agreements stating that matters
"shall" be arbitrated should be interpreted as making arbitration mandatory, except
when the parties have agreed otherwise." 1
In addition, the court did not find persuasive the plaintiffs' contention that the
parties had agreed to the jurisdiction of the state courts by including a forum
selection clause in the agreement." 2 The court found that the "more logical course
of reasoning [was] that the parties intended for both the forum selection [and
arbitration clauses] to be given effect" since the two provisions were located "on the
same page and within the same Article" of the agreement." 3 In addition, the court
concluded it "unlikely that [the parties] would have included a superfluous
arbitration [clause] ... to be given no effect."" 4
After determining that the arbitration clause was mandatory, the court had to
decide whether the forum selection clause and arbitration clause were in conflict."'
In holding that the two provisions were consistent, the court was persuaded by
contract law and "North Carolina's strong public policy favoring the settlement of
disputes by arbitration."'"16 Contract law states that "both provisions must be given
effect if this can be done by a fair or reasonable interpretation. ' 7 The court
determined that "[t]he forum selection clause should be... triggered only when a
court is needed to intervene for those judicial matters [arising] from arbitration and
when the parties have agreed to take a particular dispute to court instead of resolving
it by arbitration.""'
This conclusion that the forum selection and arbitration clause could be read
consistently is further evidenced by the fact that the agreement named certain
occasions where the parties could resort to courts, which would require the parties
to choose a particular forum." 9 Thus, the court concluded "that the forum selection
clause and the arbitration provision [did] not conflict under a reasonable
interpretation of the license agreement.'
' 20






116. Id. at 89.
117. Id. at 88. According to contract law, "each and every part of the contract must be given effect
if this can be done by any fair or reasonable interpretation; and it is only after subjecting the instrument
to this controlling principle of construction that a subsequent clause may be rejected as repugnant and
irreconcilable." Id. at 87 (quoting Davis v. Frazier, 64 S.E. 200, 201-02 (N.C. 1909).
118. Id. at 88. The arbitration process does not operate completely free of involvement of the courts.
According to North Carolina's Uniform Arbitration Act, an arbitration provision may be used to limit,
but not exclude,judicial intervention in their disputes. Id. at 87 (citing Henderson v. Herman, 49 S.E.2d
739 (N.C. App. 1991)). Thus, the forum selection clause would be triggered when a court is asked to
enforce and enter judgment on an arbitration award. Id. at 88.
119. Id. at 88.
120. Id. at 89.
[Vol. 2002, No. 2
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In E-Z Cash Advance, Inc. v. Harris,' the Arkansas Supreme Court considered
the validity of an arbitration agreement lacking in mutual obligations. 2 1 In E-Z
Cash, Harris signed an "Arkansas Deferred Presentment Agreement" pursuant to a
"payday loan" from E-Z Cash that contained an arbitration provision.23 After Harris
encountered difficulties repaying the interest due on her loan, she filed suit alleging
that E-Z Cash charged interest exceeding the maximum allowable rate. 24 E-Z Cash
moved to compel arbitration, but was denied by the trial court, which held that the
contract was one-sided and that void contracts cannot be arbitrated2 5
In determining the validity of the arbitration agreement, the Arkansas Supreme
Court relied on Showmethemoney Check Cashers, Inc. v. Williams, 26 and held that
an arbitration agreement was unenforceable when not supported by mutual
obligations. 27  Under Arkansas law, mutuality requires that the terms of the
agreement impose real liabilities on both parties. Thus, "[t]here is no mutuality of
obligation where one party uses an arbitration agreement to shield itself from
litigation, while reserving to itself the ability to pursue relief through the court
system."'2' Because Harris was the only party that promised to forego her rights to
seek redress in the judicial system, the court held that the arbitration agreement
lacked the element of mutuality and was not a valid and enforceable agreement.'
29
F. The Doctrine of Unconscionability
In Conseco Finance Servicing Corp. v. Wilder,30 plaintiffs purchased a mobile
home and financed the balance of their purchase through defendants, pursuant to a
sales contract and security agreement containing an arbitration provision.' The
plaintiffs stopped making payments on their home after defendants failed to make
121. 60 S.W.3d 436 (Ark. 2001).
122. Id. at 442.
123. Id. at 437-38. In a "payday loan" transaction, a consumer gives E-Z Cash a check in exchange
for cash and E-Z Cash agrees to hold the check until the consumer's next payday. Id. at 439. The
agreement stated that there was a check cashing fee of $40, a $10 deferred presentment fee, a $50 finance
charge, and annual percentage rate of 372.4 percent. Id. at 438.
124. Id. at 438. Specifically, Harris argued that the service charge amounts to interest that make the
annual interest rates from 300 to 720 percent. Id.
125. Id. at 442.
126. 27 S.W.3d 361 (Ark. 2000). Showmethemoney held that the essential elements of a contract
include: (1) competent parties, (2) subject matter, (3) legal consideration, (4) mutual agreement, and (5)
mutual obligation. Id. at 366. In Showmethemoney, the court held that the fact that the cashier had the
right to seek redress in a court of law while the customer was limited strictly to arbitration demonstrated
a lack of mutuality. Id.
127. E-Z Cash, 60 S.W.3d at 439. The U.A.A. applied in this case because in Volt. Info. Sciences,
Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Standford Junior Univ., 109 S.Ct. 1248 (1989), the United States
Supreme Court held that application of the F.A.A may be avoided where the parties agreed to arbitrate
in accordance with state law. Id.
128. Id. at 441.
129. Id. at 442.
130. 47 S.W.3d 335 (Ky. App. 2001).
131. Id. at 337. The arbitration provision at issue was located at the bottom of the second page of the
three-page contract. The plaintiffs initialed the bottom of each page where a bold warning to read the
agreement appeared. Id. at 338. The contract also included the names of the companies involved,




Hansen et al.: Hansen: Recent Developments
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
repairs necessary to cure manufacturer and installation defects on the new home.'
As a result, defendants brought suit under the contract, and repossessed the mobile
home.'33 The plaintiffs then brought an action against defendants, seeking to have
the contract rescinded, and the defendants responded by moving to compel
arbitration pursuant to the parties' contract. 34 The defendants appealed the trial
court's conclusion that the arbitration clause in the contract was unconscionable,
arguing that the trial court's holding interfered with their rights under the Uniform
Arbitration Act.
35
The Kentucky Court of Appeals determined that the plaintiffs' claim against the
defendants was related to the contract and thus fell within the scope of the arbitration
agreement. 3 6 After determining the plaintiffs' claim was subject to arbitration, the
Conseco court had to determine whether the agreement was unconscionable.'"
The doctrine of unconscionability represents a narrow exception to the general
rule that absent fraud in the inducement, contracts are enforced according to their
terms so long as the parties have an opportunity to read it. 3 ' In Conseco, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals concluded that even if the parties' contract was properly
characterized as an adhesive one, the arbitration provision was not abusive or
unfair.'39 The clause was not concealed or disguised in form, and its terms were
clearly stated to provide notice.'O In addition, the court was not persuaded that
mandatory arbitration prejudiced the plaintiffs' claims and did not afford them an
adequate opportunity to vindicate their substantive claim.'4' Accordingly, the court
held that the trial court erred in denying defendants' motion to compel arbitration.
42
132. Id. at 337.
133. Id. at 337-38.
134. Id. at 338. Plaintiff alleges that defendant breached warranties arising from duties under the
contract and duties imposed by the Consumer Protection Act. Id.
135. Id. at 338. More specifically, defendants argued that the U.A.A. favors arbitration and ensures
that arbitration agreements are enforced according to the standards applied to other contracts. Id. at 339.
In Conseco, neither party disputed that the contract fell within the U.A.A.. Id. at 340. The trial court's
only concern was that there was an abuse of the defendants' superior bargaining position, which could
have resulted in plaintiffs' relinquishing their right to a jury trial. Id. at 341.
136. Id. at 340. The plaintiffs argued that the Consumer Protection Act creates an overriding
exception to the arbitration act. Id. The court determined that the plaintiffs had not met the burden
placed on the party opposing arbitration to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver ofjudicial
remedies for the statutory rights at issue. Id. at 340-41.
137. Id. at 341.
138. Id. The unconscionability doctrine is to police one-sided, oppressive, and unfairly surprising
contracts, and not to police bad-bargains. Id.
139. Id. at 343. The plaintiffs' set forth a line of cases finding that similar arbitration agreements
were unconscionable based on the ground that the right to insist upon arbitration was unfairly one-sided.
Id. at 342.
140. Id. at 343.
141. Id. at 344. The court argued that under the U.A.A. "such a presumption was not a proper basis
for refusing enforcement of an arbitration clause." Id.
142. Id. at 345. The court briefly addressed plaintiffs' claim that the defendants waived their right
to arbitrate in their prosecution of its repossession action in court. Id. at 344-45. The court held that it
did not constitute a waiver because there was "no indication ... that its litigation of that matter was for
the purpose of gaining or had the effect of conferring any tactical advantage with respect to the
[plaintiffs'] subsequent complaint." Id.
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In Philyaw, the Kentucky Court of Appeals also concluded that the particular
arbitration clause was not enforceable "because it [was] patently unconscionable."'
43
The Philayaw court stated that "[u]nconscionability is concerned with the . . .
fairness of the terms of [an] agreement in relation to [the surrounding] circumstances
.... [A]n agreement is unconscionable if no person in his senses would make it on
the one hand and no fair and honest person would accept it on the other."'"
In Philyaw, the arbitration clause at issue provided that any dispute or
disagreement would be submitted to binding arbitration. 45 In addition, the clause
required that the arbitration proceedings take place in Los Angeles, California, and
that discovery be governed by the California Code of Civil Procedure.'4
Furthermore, the clause provided that each party must bear the cost of their own
attorney's fees, witness expenses, and pay one-half of the costs and fees relating to
the arbitration.141
The court considered the fact that the plaintiffs could not be expected to pay all
the expenses and set aside the time to travel to Los Angeles as required by the
clause. 41 In addition, the court addressed the fact that the agreement was presented
to the plaintiffs, the weaker party, who had no bargaining power. 49 Therefore, the
plaintiffs had no choice about the terms even if they understood the ramifications of
the arbitration clause."5 Accordingly, the court held that arbitration clause was not
enforceable.
II. SECTION 2: PROCEEDINGS TO COMPEL OR STAY ARBITRATION
After determining that an arbitration agreement exists, courts are faced with
defining the scope of the agreement, whether the parties waived the right to arbitrate,
and if the agreement is replaced by subsequent agreements. Courts must balance
these decisions against a backdrop of strong public policy toward settling disputes
outside of court. Section Two provides guidelines for courts in granting motions to
compel or stay arbitration.' 52 If a party to an arbitration challenges the existence of
a valid agreement to arbitrate, the validity of the arbitration agreement must be
determined before proceeding.' A court may then stay arbitration proceedings
upon a showing that no arbitration agreement exists. 15
A. Waiving the Right to Arbitration
143. Philylaw, 2001 WL 112107 at *2.
144. Id. at *3.
145. Id. at *1.
146. Id. at *2.
147. Id.




152. U.A.A. § 2
153. Id. at § 2(e).
154. Id. at § 2(b).
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In Schroeder Murchie Laya Assoc., Ltd. v. 1000 West Lofts, LLC, 55 Schroeder
Murchie Laya Associates, Ltd. ("SML") brought an action against 1000 West Lofts,
LLC ("1000 West") seeking payment for work performed."" 1000 West filed a
motion to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in the
contract.'57 The trial court granted and entered an order dismissing without
prejudice, but allowed for reinstatement if within ninety days an arbitration had not
been filed.15' After ninety days, neither party had filed a demand for arbitration, and
the trial court reinstated the case. 5 9 1000 West filed its answer, affirmative defenses,
and counterclaims. 160 In response, SML moved to compel arbitration and stay
proceedings.161 1000 West opposed the motion and asserted that SML had waived
its contractual right to arbitrate when it initiated the original action. 62 The trial court
agreed with 1000 West and denied SML's motion to compel arbitration, and SML
appealed. 163
It is well-settled that a contractual right to arbitrate can be waived like any other
contractual right. 64 In determining whether a party has waived its right to arbitrate,
the crucial inquiry is whether the party has acted inconsistently with its right to
arbitrate. 65  A "party's conduct amounts to waiver when the party admits an
arbitration agreement exists, yet submits issues that are arbitrable under the contract
to a court for a decision."' 6  SML did not act consistently with those of a party
whose intent was to retain the right to arbitrate. 67 SML engaged in discovery at the
trial court level, opposed 1000 West's earlier attempts to compel arbitration, failed
to file for arbitration when the case was previously dismissed on 1000 West's
motions, and then moved to reinstate the case in the circuit court. 68 Accordingly,
the Illinois Court of Appeals held that SML waived its right to arbitrate all claims
contained in their complaint and those claims closely related to those claims covered
in the complaint.
69
B. The Existence ofAgreements to Arbitrate
In Qestec, Inc. v. Krummenacker,70 the court determined whether prior
agreements without arbitration clauses were replaced by new agreements with
155. 746 N.E.2d 294 (111. App. 2001).
156. Id. at 295.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Schroeder Murchie Laya Assoc., Ltd., 746 N.E.2d 294, 295 (Ill. App. 2001).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 296.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Schroeder, 746 N.E.2d at 299, (citing Yates v. Dr. 's Assoc., Inc., 549 N.E.2d 1010 (11.App.
1990)).
165. Id. at 301, (citing St. Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 715 N.E.2d
749 (Ill.App. 1999)).
166. Id. at 301-02.
167. Id. at 302.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Qestec, Inc. v. Krummenacker, 164 F. Supp. 2d 172 (D. Mass. 2001).
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arbitration clauses made under the same employment relationship. Qestec hired
Krummenacker as a Sales Executive, and the parties executed a Sales Employment
Agreement containing an arbitration clause.' Subsequently, Krummenacker was
made an officer along with another employee through the purchase of stock, and
both signed a Cross Purchase Agreement.17 2 Months later, Krummenacker was
notified that his employment was suspended until further notice.13 A suspension
notice was later sent to Krummenacker outlining the grounds for his suspension.
74
Knimrenacker notified Qestec that the suspension notice was void because it was
without action by Qestec's Board ofDirectors. 7 ' In response, Qestec filed an action
in state court alleging that Krummenacker's conduct constituted a material breach
of the Sales Employment Agreement.'76 Krummenacker removed the case to federal
court on diversity grounds and filed an answer and counterclaim. 7 7 Qestec then
filed a demand for arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause contained in the Sales
Employment Agreement.
7 1
Krummenacker relied on F.A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co. v. Barrington, 79 arguing
that the arbitration agreement in the Sales Employment Agreement was abrogated
when he was promoted from employee to director. 0 However, the district court
distinguished the present case from Bartlett since Krummenacker's situation
involved two parallel relationships, employee and shareholder, that are not
inconsistent.'" On the other hand, Bartlett involved one employment relationship
that substantially changed mid-stream. 2  The court found that because
Krummenacker's duties did not change as a sales executive, and all of the new duties
were benefits of being a stockholder, the Sales Employment Agreement was not
abandoned. 3 In addition, the court disagreed with Krummenacker that the Cross
Purchase Agreement supplanted the Sales Employment Agreement.'' Furthermore,
the court disagreed with Krummenacker that the Sales Employment Agreement
expired because there was nothing in the agreement that required renewal to be in
writing. 5  The court found that Krummenacker's continued employment
171. Id. at 173.
172. Id. at 174. The CPA provided for the purchase of shares of Qestec's original stockholders upon
their death, incapacity, retirement or termination of employment. In addition, new by-laws were adopted
that provided for arbitration only in an event of deadlock and listed personnel decisions of hiring and
firing of employees as requiring approval by a quorum. Id.
173. Id. at 174.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. The original stockholders held a special Board meeting where all but one board member was
present and voted to remove Krummenacker as a director and terminate his employment. Id. at 175.
177. Id. at 175.
178. Id.
179. 233 N.E.2d 756. This case held that fundamental changes in the employment relationship over
a seventeen year period amounted to an abandonment of the original employment agreement.
Qestec., 164 F. Supp. 2d at 177.
180. Id. at 176.
181. Id. at 177.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. ld. at 177-78.
185. Id. at 178.
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automatically renewed the agreement by implicitly assenting to its renewal.' 6
Accordingly, the court held that the claims were to be arbitrated pursuant to the
clause contained in the Sales Employment Agreement.
8 7
In Brandon, Jones, Sandall, Zeide, Kohn, Chalal, & Musso, P.A. v.
MedPartners, Inc.,'"8 Orthopedic Center and MedPartners entered into a clinic
services management agreement that contained an arbitration clause. "' Orthopedic
Center made a demand to arbitrate a claim for anticipatory breach of contract, and
MedPartners objected to the arbitration, arguing that the claim went beyond the
scope of the arbitration provisions of the agreement. ' The court disagreed, and held
that the arbitrators had authority to remedy a breach of contract in any way
reasonably related to the contract terms, including money damages or even specific
performance.' 9'
In Hurd v. Spine-Tech, Inc.,92 Hurd wished to arbitrate a dispute over whether
Spine-Tech owed him commission income he earned as an independent sales
representative. 93 The parties entered into a sales representative agreement in 1994
that contained an arbitration clause.' 94 In 1996, Spine-Tech decided to stop relying
on independent sales representatives, and hired its own sales force. 95 Spine-Tech
offered a position to Hurd that Hurd accepted. 96 In 1997, Spine-Tech terminated
Hurd from his sales position and Hurd, relying on the 1994 agreement, argued that
Spine-Tech owed him commission and demanded that they agree to arbitration. 97
In actions to compel arbitration, courts look to the parties' intentions as
evidenced by the arbitration agreement's language. 98 However, if there is no
agreement to arbitrate, or if the dispute is not within the scope of the agreement, the
court may intervene and protect a party from being compelled to arbitrate.' 99 In
Hurd, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found that because the parties intended
186. Id.
187. Id. The court also addressed the scope of the arbitration clause in deciding the counterclaims.
It held that the counterclaims may not be arbitrable but because the plaintiff did not seek to arbitrate
those claims, Krummenacker's arguments are moot. The court did note that the arbitrator may have to
consider issues related to the counterclaims but that those inquiries were only incidental. Id. at 178-79.
188. Brandon, Jones, Sandall, Zeide, Kohn, Chalal & Musso, P.A. v. MedPartners, Inc., 203 F.R.D.
677 (Fla. Dist. App. 2001).
189. Id. at 678-79.
190. Id. at 679.
191. Id. at 686.
192. 2001 WL 605618 (Minn. App. 2001).
193. Id. at *1.
194. Id. The 1994 agreement was to terminate on March 31, 1997, but either party could terminate
it earlier with or without cause by giving 120 days written notice to the other party. In addition, it was
agreed that once Spine-Tech received pre-market approval the contract could not be canceled without
cause. The parties agree that the agreement was not extended by writing. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. Hurd also signed an employment agreement. The 1996 agreement was intended to replace
the 1994 agreement. Id.
197. Id. at *2. The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration finding that the parties did
not agree to arbitrate the dispute. An appeal followed. Id.
198. Id., (citing Minn. Fedn. Of Teachers v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 361, 210 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Minn.
1981)).
199. Id.
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Hurd's independent contractor relationship with Spine-Tech to end and an employee
relationship to begin in 1996, the 1994 agreement containing the arbitration
agreement was not in effect.2°° The court's conclusion is buttressed by the fact that
the 1996 agreement stated that it "supersedes all previous negotiation, commitments,
writings, and understandings between the parties. ' 0 ' Thus, the Hurd court held that
the 1996 agreement replaced the 1994 agreement and no arbitration agreement
covered Hurd's claim.
202
In addition, Hurd also argued that the court was not permitted to consider the
merits of the case or make factual findings. 23 Although under most circumstances
a court is not allowed to make factual findings, when one party denies the existence
of an arbitration agreement, the court "shall proceed summarily to the determination
of the issue so raised and shall order arbitration if found for the moving party;
otherwise, the application shall be denied." Likewise, a court may make a factual
finding as to whether an arbitration agreement governs a dispute. 2°4 The court held
that under the circumstances of this case, the district court did not err in making
factual findings necessary to ascertain whether or not this dispute was governed by
the parties' arbitration agreement.20 5
In Salsitz v. Kreiss,206 Salsitz executed letters ofunderstanding agreeing to invest
money in Alternative Utility Service of Illinois ("AUS"), and Kreiss executed the
letters of understanding as president of AUS. These letters of understanding did not
contain an arbitration clause.20 7 Subsequently, Salsitz executed an addendum to the
letters of understanding regarding the incentive stock option program containing an
arbitration clause.20 8 After requesting return of his investment, Salsitz received the
original investment, but was not reimbursed for his expenses. Thereafter, Salsitz
filed suit against Kreiss for breach of contract.209 Kreiss moved to dismiss the action
based on the arbitration clause found in the stock option agreement.210 Salsitz denied
agreeing to arbitrate the issues in dispute because they fell under the letters of
understanding which did not contain an arbitration clause.21'
The Illinois Supreme Court found that there was nothing in the stock option
agreement to indicate that the parties intended to submit the matter to arbitration,
since the stock option agreements were separate from the letters of understanding
which did not contain an arbitration clause.212 Thus, the court held that because the
disputes between the parties arose from the letters of understanding, the disputes did
200. Id. Hurd argues that the 1994 agreement is still in effect because it could only be canceled for
cause after the pre-market approval that occurred prior to the 1996 agreement. Id.
201. Hurdat *3.
202. Id.
203. Id. at *4.
204. Id., (citing Minn. Teamsters Pub. Law Enforcement Employee's Union, Local 320 v. County of
St. Louis, 611 N.W.2d 355,359 (Minn. App. 1990)).
205. Id.
206. 761 N.E.2d 724 (111. 2001).





212. Id. at 732.
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not fall within the scope of the arbitration clauses and were not subject to
arbitration."'
III. SECTION 5: HEARING
Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Taylor' 4 involved an insurance settlement
achieved through arbitration pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy.2"5 The
policy stated that the arbitrator should determine (1) the existence of the operator or
an uninsured motor vehicle; (2) that the insured person was legally entitled to
recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle; and (3)
the amount of payment under this part as determined by this policy or any other
applicable policy.21 6 The arbitrator awarded the insured $513,960 in damages and
$270,968.93 in costs and interest.217 The insurer subsequently filed an application
with the trial court to vacate the award, and the insured filed a counterclaim
requesting confirmation of the award.21  The trial court confirmed the award, and
an appeal followed.219
The insurer contended that the arbitration award should be vacated because the
arbitrator exceeded his authority.220 Courts must vacate an award when an arbitrator
exceeds her authority, which is determined by defming the scope of the arbitration
clause in the insurance policy.22 The insurer argued that the arbitrator's authority
was limited to determining the "amount of payment" the insured was entitled to
recover from the underinsured motorist, and not from the insurer.m In Farmers
Insurance, the Colorado Court of Appeals found that the language of the policy
supported a finding that the arbitrator was clearly empowered to determine the
amount of the underinsured motorist benefits.'
IV. SECTION 7: WITNESSES, SUBPOENAS, DEPOSITIONS
Section Seven of the UAA states, inter alia, that arbitrators may issue subpoenas
for the production of evidence and the attendance of witnesses.24 In addition,
213. Id. at 733. The court also held that Salsitz did not waive his objections to arbitration by
participating in the arbitration hearings. Id.
214. 45 P.3d 759 (Colo. App. 2001).
215. Id. at 760. The insurance policy contained an uninsured or underinsured motorist claim limit
of$100,000. Id. The policy provided for arbitration as follows: if insured and insurer do not agree (1)
that the insured is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor
vehicle, or (2) as to the amount of payment under this part, either the insured or insurer may demand the




219. Id. at 760-61.
220. Id. at 761.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 762.
224. U.A.A. § 7(a).
[Vol. 2002, No. 2
18
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2002, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2002/iss2/9
Recent Developments: UAA
Section Seven allows an arbitrator to permit depositions under the arbitrator's terms
when witnesses cannot be subpoenaed or attend the hearing.2"
In CPK/Kupper Parker Communications, Inc., v. HGL/L. Gail Hart,26 the
arbitrator denied Kupper Parker's request to depose twenty witnesses." 7 Kupper
Parker, an employer accused of discrimination by a former employee, petitioned the
circuit court to stay the arbitration, and to determine the extent of deposition
discovery permitted under the arbitration agreement.?2 The circuit court stayed the
arbitration until Kupper Parker could take "such depositions as it shall feel
necessary."22 9 The former employee, L. Gail Hart, appealed the stay, arguing that
the circuit court was without jurisdiction to overturn the arbitrator's denial of a
discovery request."0
Noting that Missouri had adopted the UAA, the court stated that there was
nothing in either the FAA or the UAA which suggested a court had any power to
order or prohibit discovery in an arbitration proceeding. 2" The only statutory
reference to the court's power over arbitration discovery is found in Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 435.380.1, which grants the court power to enforce subpoenas issued by
arbitrators. 2  Kupper Parker claimed Group Health Plan, Inc. v. BJC Health
Systems, Inc.233 was authority for the trial court's jurisdiction to stay the arbitration
proceeding and order the taking of depositions. 34 In BJC, the Missouri Court of
Appeals found that the circuit court had jurisdiction to determine if the arbitrator's
request to issue a subpoena was lawful, and to deny the subpoena if it was not
lawful. 235 The court declined Kupper Parker's invitation to extend BJC, stating that
the trial court in BJC had jurisdiction because the court was called upon to issue and
enforce the summons and subpoena." 6 Conversely, in Kupper Parker, the arbitrator
did not request for a summons to be issued or subpoena enforced, so there was no
reason for the court to use its power."17 The court pointed to Thompson v. Zavin2s
as authority on the issue." 9 In Thompson, the court stated it had no jurisdiction to
reverse the arbitrators' decision not to issue subpoenas compelling individuals to
attend the arbitration hearing.240
225. U.A.A. § 7(b).
226. 51 S.W.3d 881 (Mo. App. 2001).
227. Id. at 882.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 883.
230. Id. at 882.
231. Id. at 883-84.
232. The statute provides: The arbitrators may issue or cause to be issued subpoenas for the
attendance of witnesses and for the production of books, records, documents and other evidence, and
shall have the power to administer oaths. Subpoenas so issued shall be served, and upon application to
the court by a party or the arbitrators, enforced, in the manner provided by law for the service and
enforcement of subpoenas in a civil action. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 435.380.1 (2000).
233. 30 S.W.3d 198 (Mo. App. 2000).
234. Kupper Parker, 51 S.W.3d at 885.
235. BJC, 30 S.W.3d at 205.
236. Kupper Parker, 51 S.W.3d at 885.
237. Id. at 886.
238. 607 F. Supp. 780 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
239. Kupper Parker, 51 S.W.3d at 886.
240. Thompson, 607 F. Supp. at 782-83.
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The Missouri Court of Appeals stated that permitting Kupper Parker to appeal
the arbitrator's decision to deny a deposition request would frustrate the purpose of
arbitration, which was designed to be a less expensive and more efficient way of
resolving disputes. 24' The court stated that certain constitutional, statutory, and
court-created rights are sacrificed in arbitration in order to streamline the process and
reduce expenses.242 The court noted that one of the rights sacrificed is the right to
depose every witness endorsed by one's opponent.243 Under the informal procedures
set forth through the Rules of the American Arbitration Association, arbitrators
usually direct limited document disclosure and deny requests for interrogatories and
depositions absent compelling reasons.2" Because the court had no jurisdiction to
reverse an arbitrator's denial of a request to take depositions, the order of the circuit
court was quashed.243
V. SECTION 11: CONFIRMATION OF AN AWARD
Section Eleven of the UAA provides that a court shall confirm an arbitrator's
award unless one party opposes its confirmation and urges the award be modified,
24vacated, or corrected within the prescribed statute of limitations." Judicial
confirmation turns the arbitrator's award into a judicial ruling, thereby allowing the
ruling all of the judicial remedies available to enforce the award. When a party asks
that an award be modified, vacated, or corrected within the time limits imposed,
courts shall proceed as provided in Section Twelve and Section Thirteen of the
UAA.
2 4 7
A. The Scope of Judicial Review
In Pelc v. Petoskey,2" decedent Roger Pelc and defendant Charles Petoskey
were business partners in two entities, both of which were subject to a partnership
agreement.249 The partnership agreement included a provision regarding the rights
of a surviving partner,2 0 and a provision to arbitrate disputes arising out of the
241. Kupper Parker, 51 S.W.3d at 886.
242. Id. at 883.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 886.
246. U.A.A. § 11.
247. Id. Section 12 of the U.A.A. is concerned with vacating awards and section 13 of the U.A.A.
pertains to the modification or correction of awards.
248. 2001 WL 710188 (Mich. App. 2001).
249. Id. at * 1.
250. Id. The partnership agreement stated:
12. Death. Upon the death of either partner, the surviving partner shall have the right either to
purchase the interest of the decedent in the partnership or to terminate and liquidate the partnership
business. If the surviving partner elects to purchase the decedent's interest, he shall serve notice in
writing of such election, within three months after the death of the decedent, upon the executor or
administrator of the decedent, or, if at the time of such election no legal representative has been
appointed, upon any one of the known legal heirs of the decedent at the last-known address of such
heir. Id.
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partnership agreement. 25' After the death of Roger Pelc, 25 2 decedent's wife, the
plaintiff, sought an award of monies she alleged were owed to her under the
partnership agreement.25 Plaintiffsubsequently filed a complaint against defendants
in Macomb Circuit Court2' alleging a breach of fiduciary and other duties owed to
the estate, and requested an accounting, dissolution, and liquidation of one of the
partnerships under the Uniform Partnership Act. 255 Defendants responded by
asserting that the plaintiffs allegations were subject to arbitration under the
256partnership agreement.
Pursuant to the partnership agreement's arbitration clause, the circuit court held
that the counts brought by plaintiff were subject to arbitration, and ordered them
dismissed without prejudice.257 The court subsequently entered a stipulated order of
dismissal in which the parties agreed the court would retain jurisdiction to interpret
and enforce the partnership agreement and any arbitration award relating to
plaintiff's causes of action. 25  Arbitration proceedings commenced, and the
arbitrator issued an interim ruling that defendant Petoskey was not precluded from
purchasing decedent's partnership interest, despite Petoskey's failure to provide
written notice of his decision to do so within three months of decedent's death.259
Plaintiff subsequently fied a motion to have the trial court vacate the arbitration
award on the basis that the arbitrator exceeded his powers.2' The trial court found
the arbitrator was correct in holding that the notice provision was not a condition
precedent which prevented defendants from repurchasing the partnership interest. 26'
On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred in
attempting to retain jurisdiction to interpret the partnership agreement and arbitration
award through a stipulation of the parties.262 The court stated that an award by an
arbitrator is final and binding, and that judicial review by a Michigan court is limited
to review in accordance with standards for reviewing arbitration awards as
established by law263 or because the arbitrator committed legal error.26 The Court
of Appeals held that the trial court exceeded the permissible scope ofjudicial review
251. Id. The agreement to arbitrate found within the partnership agreement stated:
13. Arbitration. Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or the breach
hereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules, then obtaining, of the American
Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award rendered may be entered in any court havingjurisdiction thereof. Id.
252. Id. It was undisputed that Petoskey did not provide plaintiff written notice of his election to
purchase decedent's partnership interest following Pelc's death. Id. at *2
253. Id. at 1.
254. The defendants named to the lawsuit were Petoskey and Production Rubber Products Co., Inc.,
one of the partnership entities within which decedent and Petoskey were engaged.




259. Id. at *2.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at *3.
263. Id. Namely that a court may only: (1) confirm an award; (2) vacate an award if it was obtained
by fraud, duress, or other undue means; or (3) modify or correct errors that are apparent on the face of
the award. Id.
264. Id. at *4.
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by engaging in an independent interpretation of the parties' partnership agreement
and analyzing alleged errors of law not apparent on the face of the award.2ss
In Excavating, Grading, Asphalt, Private Scavengers v. A. W. Zengeler Cleaners,
Inc.,2s the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois stated that
an award cannot be enforced if it is deemed ambiguous, and the court retains
authority to remand the award to the original arbitrator for clarification. 267 However,
the district court went on to state that the remand procedure should be used sparingly
by courts and that when possible courts should avoid remanding matters back to
arbitration because of the preference for prompt and final arbitration.26' Because of
this interest, courts are permitted to interpret ambiguous awards if the ambiguity
contained in the award can be resolved by reference to the record.269
In Zengeler, the portion of the arbitrator's award the district court found to be
ambiguous was the portion granting back pay to plaintiff.270 The award stated that
"the parties are directed to determine the amount of money earned by the grievant
at the second company until the date of this Award."27 The district court reasoned
that the most logical interpretation of the award would provide the plaintiff with
back pay up to the date of reinstatement, make the greivant whole, and hasten
Zirkle's return to work.27 2 However, the language of the award provided that back
pay was to be calculated "until the date of this Award," language which the district
court found ambiguous based on the record from arbitration, and inadequate to
determine the arbitrator's intent on the matter.273 The district court held that the
remand order was limited to calculation of back pay and the remainder of the
original arbitrator's award was confirmed.274
B. UA.A. Preemption of Common Law Award Confirmation
In Capron v. Buccini,27' appellant Capron, an architect, contracted with the
Buccinis to provide drawings for the construction of a home.276 When a dispute
265. Id. at **2-5.
266. 2001 WL 138932 (N.D. Il. 2001).
267. Id. at *3.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. The relevant portion of the arbitration award read:
The proper remedy for this case is to make the grievant whole by reinstating Zirkle with appropriate
back pay. However, Zirkle took action to mitigate his damages .... After seven weeks of
unemployment, Zirkle began working for another delivery company. If Zirkle suffered a loss of wages
as a result of working for the second company, he is entitled to receive the difference in pay.
Therefore, the parties are directed to determine the amount of money earned by the grievant at the
second company until the date of this Award. If the total amount exceeds the amount of money he
would have received at Zengeler for the comparable period of time, then he is not eligible for back pay
for this period. If the amount is less than the amount he would have earned at Zengeler, then he is to
receive the difference as back pay. Id. at * 1.
271. Id.
272. Id. at *3.
273. Id.
274. Id. at *4.
275. 2001 WL 237929 (Del. Super. 2001).
276. Id. at *1.
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arose between the parties, an arbitration hearing was held as directed by the parties'
agreement and an award was issued in favor of Capron.2" Capron then filed a
complaint in the Court of Chancery two years later seeking confirmation of the
award but her action was barred by the statute of limitations found in the Delaware
statute.27' Because of the time bar, she abandoned relief under the Delaware statute
and sought recovery under the common law.279 The litigation was thereafter
removed from the Chancery Court to the Court of Common Pleas and the court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Buccinis.21 The Delaware Superior
Court dismissed Capron's claim on appeal, and stated that Delaware's version of the
UAA was the exclusive remedy available to a party seeking to confirm an arbitration
award, and the one year statute of limitations for confirmation of an arbitration
award contained in Delaware statute prevented the matter from proceeding. s
VI. SECTION 12: VACATING AN AWARD
Section Twelve of the UAA determines when courts should vacate an award, the
statute of limitations for bringing forth motions to vacate, and when courts may
order a rehearing before new arbitrators. 2 The UAA also provides that if an
application to vacate is denied and no motion to modify or correct the award is
pending, courts shall confirm the award.2 3 Section Twelve states that upon
application by a party, courts shall vacate an award where: (1) the award was
obtained through fraud, corruption, or undue means; (2) there exists evidence of
misconduct by the arbitrator that prejudiced the rights of one of the parties; (3) the
arbitrator exceeded her powers; (4) the arbitrator refused to postpone arbitration after
sufficient cause was shown or refused to hear evidence material to the matter thereby
substantially prejudicing the rights of one party; or (5) there was no arbitration
agreement in existence, the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under
Section Two, and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without
raising an objection.2
The statute of limitations provision contained in Section Twelve articulates that
an application to vacate an award under Section Twelve shall be made within ninety
days of a copy of the award being delivered to the applicant, unless the award was
predicated upon "undue means."2 5 In the case of such undue means, the application




280. Id. The Court of Chancery dismissed the litigation, transferring the case to the Court of
Common Pleas because the Chancery Court's jurisdiction was based solely on the UAA as enacted in
Delaware. Id.
281. Id. at **2-3. The appeal in this matter was dismissed because the Court of Common Pleas did
not have subject matterjurisdiction to review the matter, and because of this, there was no right of appeal
to the Delaware Superior Court. Id.
282. U.A.A. § 12.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. U.A.A. § 12(b).
2002]
23
Hansen et al.: Hansen: Recent Developments
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
had constructive knowledge of the grounds to vacate. 8 6 If the application to vacate
is denied and no motion for modification or correction of the award is pending, the
award shall be confirmed.8 7
A. Awards Procured by Corruption, Fraud, or Other Undue Means
In Rosenthal-Collins Group v. Reiff28 Rosenthal-Collins Group and its partners
operated a futures trading company, which managed Reiff's futures account.2 9 Reiff
claimed the company made unauthorized trades from his futures account, resulting
in over $200,000 in financial losses.29 The issue proceeded to arbitration, as
provided for by the parties' management agreement.29' On August 21, 1997, during
the arbitration proceeding, Reiff sent a letter to one of the members of the arbitration
panel. 92 The letter contained evidence rebutting a claim made at the arbitration
hearing stating Reiff was a convicted drug dealer.293 On August 25, 1997, the
arbitration panel issued an award in favor of Reiff and awarded him in excess of
$240,000 in damages.2 94 After hearing that Reiff had sent a letter to one of the
arbitrators, Rosenthal-Collins Group filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award
in the Cook County Circuit Court.2 95 The trial court vacated the arbitration award
under the Illinois arbitration statute.296 The court found that the letter constituted ex
parte communication with an arbitrator, which suggested corruption in the arbitration
process.2 97 Reiff appealed the decision to the Illinois Court of Appeals, claiming
there was no corruption in the arbitration process because the arbitration panel
actually found in his favor on August 19, 1997, before he sent the letter to the
arbitrator.29' Reiff stated that the notification issued on August 25th was merely a
reiteration of the arbitration decision reached on August 19th.99 Reiff also claimed
no fraud existed because the arbitrator never read the letter that was sent to his
office.3"
The Illinois Court of Appeals vacated the arbitration award because the ex parte
communication constituted fraud in the procurement of the arbitration award.30' The
Illinois arbitration statute allows courts to vacate an arbitration award if it was
"procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means."302 First, the court determined
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Rosenthal-Collins Group, L.P., Lehigh Valley Futures, Inc., and Gregory Deuth v. Reiff, 748
N.E.2d 229 (I11. App. 2001).
289. Id. at 230-31.
290. Id.





296. Id. at 232.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 234.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 232.
302. Id.; See U.A.A. § 12(a) as adopted by Illinois U.A.A. 710 ILCS 5/12(a) (West 1998).
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that an arbitration order is final when the award is issued, not when the decision is
made." 3 Because the arbitration award could have been altered at any time before
it was issued on August 25th, the award could not be considered final until that
date. °' Therefore, the arbitration process was still going on at the time the letter was
sent, making it a ex parte communication." 5 Second, the court stated that ex parte
contact with an arbitrator during the arbitration process raises a presumption that the
award was procured by "fraud or other undue means."3°6 A party can overcome the
presumption of fraud "by providing sufficient evidence that the presumption is
unwarranted. ' ,30 7 Reiff attempted to do this by claiming the arbitrator's secretary
returned the letter to him unopened and the arbitrator was out of the country when
the letter was at his office.30 8 However, Reiff provided no evidence to prove these
assertions and failed to overcome the presumption of fraud, and due to the
presumption of fraud, the Illinois Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's order to
vacate the award.3 9
B. Arbitrators Exceeding Their Authority
Arbitration is a matter of contract and an arbitrator can only act pursuant to the
authority given to him in the arbitration agreement. 0 If the arbitrator exceeds this
authority, the U.A.A. allows a court to vacate the arbitration award. 31' In Fort
Wayne Education Association v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, 2 the Indiana
Court of Appeals decided whether an arbitrator exceeded his authority by
interpreting a collective bargaining agreement 1 3 Fort Wayne Community Schools
("School District") terminated a teacher for violating the school's Role Model and
Sexual Harassment Policies.a1 4 The collective bargaining agreement between the
Fort Wayne Education Association ("Association") and the School District stated
that termination issues would be determined by binding arbitration.3"5
The arbitrator concluded that the teacher did violate the School District's
policies by engaging in inappropriate interaction with a student, but determined that
the violation only required suspension rather than termination." 6 The School District
appealed the arbitration award to the Allen County Superior Court, claiming the
arbitrator exceeded his authority by deciding the conduct only warranted
suspension. 7 The School District's code of conduct specifically allowed for




307. Id. at 233.
308. Id. at 231.
309. Id. at 235.
310. Hart v. McChristian, 42 S.W. 3d 552, 556 (Ark. 2001).
311. U.A.A. § 12(a)(3).
312. Ft. Wayne Educ. Assn. v. Ft. Wayne Community Schools, 753 N.E. 2d 672 (Ind. App. 2001).
313. Id. at 674.
314. Id.
315. Id.
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termination if the policies were violated.3 " The trial court vacated the arbitration
award, finding that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in his interpretation of the
policies."a 9
The Indiana Court of Appeals concluded that the arbitrator did not exceed his
authority in his interpretation of the school policies, and upheld the arbitration
award.3 20 The court explained that "[tihe role of the appellate court in reviewing the
arbitration award is limited to determining whether the challenging party has
established any grounds [for vacating the award] under the UAA. ' '32 1 Under Indiana
statute, an arbitration award can be vacated if the arbitrator's decision exceeds his
power.322 However, in Fort Wayne Education, the Indiana Court of Appeals found
that the arbitrator did not exceed his power since he did not reach a conclusion that
conflicted with the School District's Role Model and Sexual Harassment Policies.
3 z
Had the arbitrator determined that termination could not result from a violation of
the School District's policies, the arbitrator would be guilty of exceeding his powers
by rewriting the School District's disciplinary policies.3 24 The court found that the
arbitrator's interpretation did recognize termination as an option for the violations,
but determined suspension was a more appropriate remedy.32 5 Since this
interpretation was within the arbitrator's authority, the Indiana Court of Appeals
reversed the decision and the arbitration award was upheld.
3 26
In Pelc v. Petoskey,32 7 the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that arbitrators
exceed the scope of their authority when they act beyond the material terms of the
contract from which they draw their authority, or in contravention of controlling
principles of law.3 2' However, the Pelc court added that only the arbitrator can
interpret the contract, and the trial court has no jurisdiction to replace the arbitrator's
interpretation with its own.3 2 9 The court held that the trial court exceeded its
authority by interpreting the terms of the contract, but upheld the decision,
concluding that no harm was caused because the trial court reached the same legal
conclusion as the arbitrator.330
Arbitrators do have the power to interpret contracts under the arbitration
agreement, but they are limited as to which issues they can decide. 33' Arbitration is
a creature of contract; therefore the parties can choose which issues to submit to
arbitration.332 An arbitrator exceeds his authority if he addresses issues not
318. Id. at 676.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 676-77.
321. Id. at 675. Ind. Code § 34-57-2-13(a) (2002) provides grounds upon which a trial court may
vacate an arbitration award.
322. Ind. Code. § 34-57-2-13(a) (2002).
323. 753 N.E. 2d at 676.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 676-77.
327. Pelc v. Petoskey, 2001 WL 710188 (Mich. App. 2001).
328. Id. at *3 (quoting DAIIE v. Gavin, 331 N.W.2d 418, 434 (Mich. 1982)).
329. Id.
330. Id. at *4.
331. Hart v. McChristian, 42 S.W. 3d 552, 557 (Ark. 2001).
332. Id. at 557.
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authorized by the arbitration agreement.333 In Virginia Eastern Company, LLC v.
N.C. Monroe Construction Company,334 the Circuit Court of Virginia determined
whether an arbitrator exceeded his authority by deciding who was responsible for
time delays and expense payment problems in a construction case.3 Virginia
Eastern was the owner of a parcel of land who contracted with Monroe Construction
to complete a Hampton Inn Motel on the property.336 Several delays occurred in the
construction process, and Monroe Construction claimed that Virginia Eastern failed
to make certain payments during the course of the project. 337 The construction
contract called for arbitration to resolve any disputes, and the arbitration proceeding
was to be governed by the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules.338
The arbitrator determined Virginia Eastern was responsible for the time delays
and payment problems, and entered an award in favor of Monroe Construction.339
Virginia Eastern filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award, claiming that the
arbitrator did not have the authority to answer the types of questions addressed in the
case.
340
The Virginia Circuit Court held that the arbitrator had the authority to make
decisions regarding time delays and expense problems, and that by doing so, he did
not violate Virginia statute.341 The court stated that arbitration is simply a matter of
contract between the parties, and a way to resolve disputes that the parties have
agreed to submit to arbitration.342 The contract between the parties stated that "any
controversy or claim arising out of or related to the contract or the breach thereof,
shall be settled by arbitration. ' '343 The court concluded time delays and expenses
were clearly related to the contract or the breach of the contract, and therefore the
arbitrator did not exceed his authority by addressing these issues.
34
Similarly, an arbitrator has no authority to ignore the plain language of a
contract in dispute or interpret contractual language that is not ambiguous. In 7-
Eleven v. Dar,3 a convenience store franchiser brought a motion to vacate an
arbitration award.3' The Cook County Circuit Court denied the franchisor's motion
and the franchisor appealed. 347 The Illinois Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
the cause with directions to vacate the arbitration award, and ordered a rehearing
before the arbitrator.348 The Illinois Supreme Court then entered an order directing
333. Id.
334. Va. E. Co., L.L.C. v. N.C. Monroe Constr. Co., 2001 WL 700368 (Va. Cir. 2001).
335. Id. at * 1.
336. Id.




341. Id. at *4. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.09 (2000).
342. Va. E. Co., 2001 WL 700368, *3.
343. Id.
344. Id. at *4.
345. 757 N.E.2d 515 (I11. App. 2001).
346. Id. at 518.
347. Id. at 519.
348. Id. at 524.
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the Illinois Court of Appeals to vacate its earlier order and reconsider the issue in
light of the Supreme Court's holding in Voyles v. Sandia Mortgage Corp.3 49
In 7-Eleven, petitioner 7-Eleven argued the arbitrator exceeded his authority in
several different ways. First 7-Eleven asserted that the arbitrator exceeded his
authority when he determined that respondent Dar did not waive his right to
arbitration.35 ° In the contested arbitration, the arbitrator did not construe the
limitations period in the context of the agreement between the parties, instead
finding as a matter of law that the limitations period under Illinois law controlled
over the limitation period in the parties' agreement.35" ' Because of this, the Illinois
Court of Appeals held that the arbitrator correctly determined that the notice
limitation period in the agreement was in conflict with Illinois law, and therefore did
not exceed his authority.352
7-Eleven also asserted that the arbitrator exceeded his authority when he
determined that the agreement had been wrongfully terminated.353 However, the
Illinois Court of Appeals found that the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act of 1987
contained a "good cause" termination requirement and thus the arbitrator did not
exceed his authority in concluding petitioner 7-Eleven had wrongfully terminated
the agreement.34
Next, 7-Eleven contended that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by awarding
punitive damages contrary to an express provision of the arbitration agreement.35 5
Under Illinois law, arbitrators may award punitive damages only where the parties
have agreed that the arbitrator has authority to confer such a damage award.3"6
Pursuant to the Illinois Supreme Court's recent decision in Voyles, the Illinois Court
of Appeals concluded that the arbitrator's damage award for breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing were punitive in nature.357 Since the parties to the
arbitration proceeding did not expressly agree for the arbitrator to have the authority
to confer punitive damages, the arbitrator exceeded his authority by doing So. 31"
Petitioner 7-Eleven's last allegation of the arbitrator exceeding his authority
centered on the fact that the arbitrator did not decide all of the issues presented
before him in the arbitration proceeding.359 At common law, an arbitration award is
void and unenforceable unless it disposes of all matters properly submitted to the
349. 751 N.E.2d 1126 (I11. App. 2001).
350. 757 N.E.2d at 520.
351. Id. The agreement required the parties to submit all controversies arising between them that
could not be mutually resolved to arbitration. The agreement further provided that:
A demand for arbitration: if based in whole or part on wrongful termination, shall be filed with the
[American Arbitration Association] within 10 days after a 30 day or longer notice of termination is
issued or prior to any other notice of termination becoming effective. Id.
352. Id. at 521. The Illinois Court of Appeals determined that the arbitrator did not ignore the notice
limitation period contained in the arbitration agreement and did not interpret unambiguous contractual
language as petitioner 7-Eleven suggested. Id.
353. Id. at 521.
354. Id. at 521-522.
355. Id. at 522.
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proceeding. 360 In 7-Eleven, the arbitration award provided that it was in "full
settlement of all claims submitted to this arbitration., 361 While there exists a
presumption that the arbitrators considered and fully determined all matters
submitted, the Illinois Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner 7-Eleven, and held
that the arbitrator failed to decide all of the issues properly presented.362 The Illinois
Court of Appeals went on to state that since there were still controversies in
existence that the parties to the arbitration could not mutually resolve and that
remained undecided after the arbitration proceeding concluded, the arbitrator had
failed to fully decide all of the issues properly.363
The Illinois Court of Appeals concluded that the arbitrator exceeded his
authority in awarding damages to the respondent for breaches of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and for failing to decide all of the issues
presented. As of result of this finding, the judgment of the circuit court was reversed
and the cause remanded to the circuit court with directions to enter an order vacating
the award and order a rehearing before the arbitrator consistent with the Illinois
Court of Appeals' decision.36
It is clear that an arbitrator is limited to addressing issues submitted to
arbitration by the parties. 365 Additionally, the arbitrator's power to award remedies
is also restricted by the agreement. In Flenory v. Eagle's Nest Apartments,3" the
Kansas Court of Appeals held that an arbitrator exceeds his authority if he imposes
a legislative cap on the amount of a possible award when the parties have not agreed
to the cap in their contract.367 Flenory's son drowned in a apartment complex
swimming pool, and a wrongful death suit was subsequently brought against Eagle's
Nest Apartments. 368 The parties agreed to settle the claim through arbitration with
a high-low cap of $50,000-$300,000 on the arbitration award. 69 The arbitrator
awarded pecuniary damages in the amount of $ 100,000 or $137,500, depending on
which legislative cap applied to pecuniary damages.3 70 Flenory then filed a motion
with the district court to determine which legislative cap applied.37' The district court
determined that the $100,000 cap was applicable and awarded pecuniary damages
accordingly.372 Flenory then filed a motion with the Kansas Court of Appeals to
determine if the application of the $100,000 cap was correct.373
The Kansas Court of Appeals held that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by
applying a cap to the recovery of pecuniary damages when the parties had not
360. Id.
361. Id. at 524.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 524.
365. Va. E. Co., L.L.C., 2001 WL 700368 at *4.
366. Flenory v. Eagle's Nest Apartments, 22 P.3d 613 (Kan. App. 2001).
367. Id. at 613.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 613-614. The Kansas Legislature had recently amended the cap on pecuniary damages for
wrongful death claims in civil litigation, increasing it from $100,000 to $250,000. See Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 60-1903 (1994).
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consented to such a cap.374 The Flenory court stated that the high-low cap agreement
should have replaced the legislative cap for the arbitration proceedings. 3 75 However,
since Flenory did not claim the arbitrator exceeded his authority and only asked the
court for a decision on which the legislative cap should apply, the court concluded
that it did not have the power to vacate the decision.376 The court then remanded the
case to the district court to confirm the award in an amount not limited by the
legislative cap. 77
The Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in D & E Construction v. Robert J.
Denley Co.,37 also addressed an arbitration award outside the arbitrators authority. 9
In that decision, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the arbitrator exceeded his
authority by awarding attorney's fees to D & E Construction.s8 ° The court stated that
arbitrators only have the power to arbitrate issues put before them by the parties, and
even if the agreement gives an arbitrator broad discretion to determine disputes
arising from the contract, the contract must be read as a whole to determine the scope
of power.38' Reading the contract as a whole, the D&E Construction court found that
the arbitration agreement did not allow for the arbitrator's award of attorney's
fees.
38 2
While the Tennessee Supreme Court found that the arbitrator did not have the
power to award attorney's fees, the court chose not to vacate the entire award."3 The
D&E Construction court only vacated the portion of the arbitration award conferring
attorney's fees, stating that where parts of an award are not dependent on one
another, the award is severable in part and sustainable in part.3' The court followed
this course of action because the purpose of arbitration is to promote prompt
settlement of disputes, and vacating only the offensive portion of the arbitration
award helps further that goal.385
In Sportsman's Quickstop I, Ltd. v. Didonato,386 defendant Didonato appealed
from a judgment confirming an arbitration award which settled the amount of
monthly rent charged in a sublease with plaintiff Sportsman's Quickstop, and from
a subsequent order denying his motion to amend the judgment of the trial court.387
Defendant contended that the arbitrators exceeded their authority and their award
was ambiguous."88 For an arbitrator's award to be vacated under Colorado law, an
application seeking such relief must be made "within thirty days after delivery of a





378. D & E Constr. v. Robert J. Denley Co., Inc., 38 S.W.3d 513 (Tenn. 2001).
379. Id. at 514.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 518.
382. Id. at 519.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 520.
386. 32 P.3d 633 (Colo. App. 2001).
387. Id. at 634.
388. Id.
389. Id.
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because defendant's response to plaintiffs motion to confirm the award was filed
fifty-five days after he received a copy of the award, he was barred from requesting
that the award be vacated and from presenting other substantive defenses in response
to plaintiffs motion.3"
C. Arbitrators Refusing to Hear Material Evidence
Section Twelve of the UAA also allows courts to vacate an award if an arbitrator
refused to admit relevant evidence.3 9' Virginia Eastern Company v. N. C. Monroe
Construction Company392 illustrates the application and limitations of this
provision.3 93 In Virginia Eastern, the arbitrator refused to allow Virginia Eastern
Company to present relevant evidence to the arbitrator.394 Virginia Eastern claimed
a violation of the Virginia arbitration statute, which specifically allows for the
admission of relevant evidence.395 The circuit court determined that although parties
have the right to introduce evidence material to the controversy, the arbitrator is only
bound to admit evidence that the parties agreed to allow pursuant to the arbitration
agreement.3 96 In the arbitration agreement at hand, the parties agreed to be governed
by the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, which state that "the arbitrator shall
be the judge of the admissibility of the evidence offered, and conformity to legal
rules of evidence shall not be necessary."'3 97 Because the parties agreed to allow the
arbitrator to determine the admissibility of evidence, the court can only overturn the
decision if it is based on palpable error that is obvious and easily perceptible.39 The
court found that the error in this case was not severe enough to be considered
palpable error, and refused to vacate the award based on the arbitrator's refusal to
allow the evidence.3 99
In United School District v. United Education Association,400 a school district
argued that the arbitrator erred in refusing to consider negotiating history, custom,
and practice of parties to a collective bargaining agreement."°  While the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court found this argument persuasive, the court still
had to address the issue of what standard of review to apply in addressing what
consequences would result from the arbitrator's error. 2 Under the UAA as adopted
by Pennsylvania, courts shall vacate an arbitration award when an arbitrator refuses
to hear evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise conducts a hearing in such
a way as to substantially prejudice the rights of one party.4°3 The Pennsylvania court
390. Id. at 634-35.
391. U.A.A. § 12(a)(4).
392. Virginia E. Company, L.L.C, 2001 WL 700368 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 11, 2001).
393. Id. at *1. For a full account of the facts see supra n. 334.
394. Id.
395. Id; See Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-581.010(4) (1998).
396. Id. at *4.
397. Id.
398. Id. at *5.
399. Id.
400. 782 A.2d 40 (Pa. Cmiw. 2001).
401. Id.
402. Id. at 42.
403. Id. at 47.
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held that it could not vacate the award under this "substantial prejudice" standard
since the arbitrator did in fact admit the evidence, but rebutted in his opinion,
believing it to be irrelevant to the matter. 4
D. Vacating Awards Where No Arbitration Agreement Existed
Because arbitration agreements define the scope of an arbitrator's authority, a
valid arbitration agreement must exist before parties may submit a dispute to
arbitration. If no arbitration agreement exists between the parties, a court may
vacate the arbitration award.4"' In Wahl v. Chicago Roofing Contractors
Association,40 Wahl was accused of violating a provision of the collective
bargaining agreement ("CBA") between the Roofers Union ("Union") and the
Chicago Roofing Contractors Association.40 7  A Joint Grievance Committee
addressed the issue, finding that Wahl violated the CBA.40 Wahl subsequently filed
a motion to vacate the award with the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, claiming that the Union violated the CBA.4 9 The Union and the
Roofing Contractors Association then filed a motion to dismiss Wahl's motion to
vacate because it was time barred under the Illinois arbitration statute. 410 Wahl
claimed that the Illinois arbitration statute's ninety-day filing statute of limitations
did not apply to his appeal because the Joint Grievance Committee was not an
arbitrator, meaning the case was not subject to Illinois' arbitration statute.41' Wahl
asserted that the Joint Grievance Committee was not an arbitrator because the
committee was not referred to in the CBA as an arbitrator, and the contract between
the parties stated that an "arbitrator" will be called on only if the Joint Grievance
Committee failed to reach a resolution." 2
The Northern District of Illinois concluded the Joint Grievance Committee was
an arbitrator." 3 Therefore, the ninety day statute of limitations for filing a motion to
vacate applied to Wahl.4 4 The court stated that "courts have consistently considered
decisions by grievance panels, with other designations, as arbitration awards. 415
The court also determined that Wahl's complaint was an appeal of an arbitration
award since the allegations contained in his petition were of a type typically heard
in arbitration appeals. 4 6 The CBA did not provide for a specific procedure to vacate
an arbitration award; therefore the court applied the Illinois version of the UAA, and
the ninety day deadline for applications to vacate an award was in effect.417 Since
Wahl did not file his motion within the ninety day time frame, the court held that his
complaint was barred by the statute of limitations.4 0
404. Id.
405. U.A.A. § 12(a)(5).
406. Wahl v.Lab. Rel. Group of Chicago Roofing Contractors Assn., 2001 WL 789424 (N.D. Il. July
11,2001).







414. 2001 WL 789424 at *3.
415. Id. at *2.
416. Id. at *3.
417. Id. at *4.
418. Id.
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In Louisiana Safety Systems, Inc. v. Tengasco, Inc. 419 Louisiana Safety Systems,
Inc. ("LSS") filed suit against Tengasco and Ted Scallan alleging that they provided
drilling equipment and supplies to Tengasco pursuant to a credit agreement
personally guaranteed by Scallan. 420  Tengasco asserted that Scallan no longer
worked for Tengasco and that Torch, Inc. was the entity who solicited purchase of
the products provided by LSS, but did not raise this defense until the agreement had
already been to arbitration.42 ' The Knox County Circuit Court confirmed the
arbitration award, and overruled Tengasco's motion to vacate the award.4 '
Under Tennessee law, a trial court may modify or correct an award "if
arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, and the award may
be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues
submitted."423 Tengasco argued the arbitrator exceeded his authority because he had
no authority since no arbitration was in effect when the majority of events giving rise
to LSS's and Torch's claims occurred.424 Several elements must be met before a
claim such as Tengasco's can succeed. A party claiming there was no arbitration
agreement in existence at the relevant time can succeed in having the arbitration
award vacated on that basis if: (1) there was no arbitration agreement and no judicial
determination that an arbitration agreement did exist; and (2) the party did not
participate in the arbitration hearing without raising an objection.42 Because
Tengasco participated in the arbitration hearing without objection, the Tennessee
Court of Appeals held that Tengasco was estopped from asserting that the arbitrator
exceeded his authority.426
E. An Exception to U.A.A. Section 12(a)(5)
Model UAA Section Twelve(a)(5) states the general nile that relief awarded by
arbitrators that could not or would not be granted by a court is not grounds for
vacating or refusing to confirm an award.4 21 In Sherman v. Amica MutualIns. Co. ,428
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania outlined an exception to this general rule, stating
that in limited circumstances, the UAA as adopted in Pennsylvania provides a second
standard for the review of statutory arbitration claims. 29 This second standard is
419. 2001 WL 1105395 (Tenn. App. Sept. 21, 2001).
420. Id. at *1.
421. Id. at * 1-4.
422. Id.
423. Id. at *4.
424. Id. at *5.
425. La. Safety Sys., Inc., 2001 WL 1105395 at *5.
426. Id.
427. U.A.A. § 12(a)(5).
428. 782 A.2d 1006 (Pa. Super. 2001).
429. ld. at 1007-10. A different argument for a similar remedy is discussed by the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania in Cerankowski v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. where the court stated that a
trial court may vacate an award under the U.A.A. as enacted in Pennsylvania when the relevant clause
in an insurance policy is claimed to be void as against public policy:
An allegation that a statutory arbitration award is contrary to law is not a sufficient basis for vacating
the award. However, a trial court can review a clause in an insurance policy where the claimant
alleges that such a provision is contrary to public policy. In general, we will reverse a trial court's
decision regarding whether to vacate an arbitration award only for an abuse of discretion or error of
law. However, where the trial court determines that a provision in an insurance policy violates the
public policy of this Commonwealth, our standard of review is plenary as said issue presents a
question of law for our determination.
Cerankowski v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 783 A.2d 343, 345 (Pa. Super. 2001).
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limited to instances when: (1) the Commonwealth government submits a controversy
to arbitration; (2) a political subdivision submits a controversy with an employee or
representative of employees to arbitration; or (3) any person has been required by
law to submit or agree to submit a controversy to arbitration pursuant to this
subchapter. 30
When the second standard is applicable, a court may modify or correct an award
when the award is contrary to law and the court would have entered a different
judgment or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.43 In Sherman, the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania held that the insurance policy containing the agreement to
arbitrate could not be reviewed under the second "contrary to law" standard, namely
because the insurance policy was issued well after the effective date of the act, 432 and
an endorsement to the parties' insurance policy provided for the arbitration of claims
in accordance with the Pennsylvania arbitration statute.433 Because appellant's
arbitration agreement failed to meet the requirements for a contrary to law standard
to apply, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ordered that the award be confirmed.434
F. Judicial Review of Errors of Law
The UAA does not allow judicial review of errors of law made by an
arbitrator. 4"1 In Hough v. State Farm Insurance,46 Hough was walking along the
highway and was hit by a passing car.437 After settling with the driver's insurance
company, Hough made an underinsured motorist claim with his insurance company,
State Farm.4 38 A dispute arose over the amount of underinsured motorist coverage
available under his insurance policy, and the matter proceeded to arbitration pursuant
to the insurance contract. 439 The arbitrator concluded that the policy provided
$15,000 to $30,000 of coverage." ' Hough filed a motion to vacate the arbitration
award due to an error of law made by the arbitrator.4" State Farm filed a motion to
dismiss Hough's motion to vacate the award on the ground that the court lacked
jurisdiction over his petition."2
The Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania held that the court could not
vacate an arbitration award due to an error of law made by the arbitrator." 3 The
court reasoned that Pennsylvania's arbitration statute ("PUAA") sets forth situations
when a court may vacate an award, and that the court did not have jurisdiction to
vacate an award for an error of law made by the arbitrator.4" The PUAA states that
"[tihe fact that the relief awarded by the arbitrators was such that it could not or
430. Sherman, 782 A.2d at 1008.
431. Id. at 1008-1009.
432. The effective date of the act was December 4, 1980.
433. Sherman, 782 A.2d at 1009.
434. Id.
435. U.A.A. § 12(a)(5).
436. Hough v. State Farm Insurance Company, 51 Pa. D. & C. 4th 64, 65 (Pa. Super. 2001).




441. Id. Hough claims that the arbitrator erred in interpreting the insurance contract with State Farm,
leading to an improper conclusion regarding the amount of available under-insured motorist coverage
available on his policy.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 70.
444. Id.
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would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not a ground for vacating or
refusing to confrm'n an award.""' 5 The court therefore granted State Farm's motion
to dismiss on these grounds." 6
Although a court following the UAA generally does not have jurisdiction to
vacate an arbitration award for an error of law, parties can agree to this type of
judicial review in their arbitration agreements. In Northern Indiana Commuter
Transportation District v. Chicago SouthshoreandSouth BendRailroad,"7 Northern
Indiana Commuter Transportation District ("NICTD") operated passenger trains
between Chicago and South Bend, Indiana."8 NICTD also owned the track, leasing
rights to use the track to Chicago Southshore and South Bend Railroad ("Chicago
Southshore") for freight transportation." 9 Chicago Southshore agreed to pay for a
portion of the maintenance costs for the track, and agreed to arbitrate any disputes
arising out of the agreement.450 The arbitration agreement contained a provision
allowing either party to seek judicial review of any errors of law made in arbitration
proceedings.45 1 After a dispute arose over maintenance payments, the parties sent
the issue to arbitration, and the arbitrator ruled in favor of Chicago Southshore.452
NICTD appealed the decision, citing an error of law made by the arbitrator.45 The
trial court confirmed the arbitration award without reviewing the error of law claim,
stating that it was outside the jurisdiction of the court.4' NICTD then appealed the
confirmation to the Indiana Court of Appeals, claiming the trial court erred by not
reviewing the question of law as provided for by the arbitration agreement.455
The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the
court should have reviewed the error of law claim in the arbitration award.456 The
Indiana Court of Appeals stated that "parties are free to define the nature and scope
of the questions which may be arbitrated and the extent to which the arbitrator's
decision must conform to general principles of law., 457 Indiana statutory would
normally not allow a trial court to review errors of law made by the arbitrator, but
the "parties may contractually agree to expand the subjects for judicial review
beyond those set forth in the Uniform Arbitration Act.""45 Because the terms of the
arbitration provision called for judicial review of questions of law, the trial court
should have addressed the issue on appeal.459
445. Id. See 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 7314(a) (2001).
446. Id. at 77.
447. 744 N.E.2d 490 (Ind. App. 2001).




452. Id. at 494.
453. Id. NICTD claims that the arbitrator erred in interpreting the contract by miscalculating the
amount ofmaintenance fees owed by Chicago Southshore under the terms of the contract's maintenance
fee formula. Id. at 493.
454. Id.
455. Id. at 494.
456. Id. at 497.
457. Id. at 494 (citing Bopp v. Bramers, 677 N.E.2d 629, 632 (Ind.App. 1997)).
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G. Judicial Review of Errors of Fact
In addition to the limitations on judicial review of errors of law, the UAA also
limits judicial review of errors of fact."4 In Hart v. McChristian,6' the Supreme
Court of Arkansas determined that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to decide
an issue of fact before submitting the issue to arbitration." 2 Mr. and Mrs. Hart were
general partners in a radio station, owning ten percent of the business.43 Pursuant
to an agreement giving the Harts exclusive discretion in the business's management
and control, McChristian gained ownership of the other ninety percent of the station
as a limited partner, and thereafter attempted to remove the Harts as managers."46
The partnership contract allowed for removal of the managers upon agreement of
partners holding seventy five percent of the partnership units, and if the general
partners objected to the removal, the case would proceed to arbitration.4 5 In
objecting to the removal, the Harts maintained arbitration was not warranted because
at the time of the vote, McChristian only owned eighteen percent of the station, and
therefore lacked proper standing to remove them as general partners. 46
In the arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator found in favor of McChristian and
ordered the Harts removed from management.4 67 The Harts subsequently filed a
motion to vacate the decision, claiming that the chancery court should have first
decided whether McChristian had standing to remove them as managers."' The
chancery court affirmed the arbitration order, and on appeal, the Arkansas Court of
Appeals affirmed removal of the Harts.469 The Harts appealed to the Arkansas
Supreme Court to determine if the trial court erred by not deciding the threshold
question of whether McChristian had standing to remove them as managers before
the issue was submitted to arbitration. 7i
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the trial court was correct in refusing to
vacate the arbitrator's award based on an error of fact.47' The Arkansas arbitration
statute only allows for judicial review of arbitration decisions in a limited number
ofsituations.4 72 Therefore it was not within the trial court's jurisdiction to determine
if McChristian owned eighteen percent or eighty percent of the radio station at the
time of the Harts' removal. 73 Since a trial court must defer to the factual findings
of the arbitrator and may only determine if the arbitrator acted within his jurisdiction,
the Arkansas Supreme Court confirmed the arbitration award in favor of
McChristian.
47 4
460. U.A.A. § 12(a)(5).
461. 42 S.W.3d 552 (Ark. 2001).
462. Id. at 560.








471. Id. at 561.
472. Id. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-108-212(b) (LEXIS L. Publg. 2002).
473. Id.
474. Id.
['Vol. 2002, No. 2
36
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2002, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2002/iss2/9
Recent Developments: UAA
H. Timeliness of Motions to Vacate
Section Twelve (b) of the UAA states that "an application under this section [to
vacate an arbitration award] must be made within ninety days after the delivery of
a copy of the award to the applicant, except that, if predicated upon corruption,
fraud, or other undue means, it shall be made within ninety days after such grounds
are known or should have been known."
4
"5
In Marks v. Marks,47' the parties entered into arbitration proceedings to
determine division of marital property after a divorce.477 After the arbitrator made
his determination and the arbitration award was confirmed by the trial court, Mr.
Marks appealed to the Virginia Court of Appeals, seeking to vacate the order for
errors made by the arbitrator in the property division.478
The Virginia Court of Appeals determined that the UAA as adopted by Virginia
governed the case since the parties agreed to arbitrate under Virginia law.479 The
court stated that under these circumstances "the Uniform Arbitration Act...
provides the exclusive means for challenging errors in the award by the arbitrator
and sets forth the procedures for obtaining judicial review and confirmation of the
arbitration award."'8  The UAA requires a party to file a motion to vacate an
arbitration award within ninety days after receiving the award.' Because Mr.
Marks failed to file an application for vacation of the arbitration award within the
ninety day statute of limitations, the Virginia Court of Appeals prohibited him from
raising the issue on appeal. 82
While it is clear that motions to vacate awards are limited by the ninety day
statute of limitations, courts differ in their holdings on when the statute begins to run.
In Cianflone v. Indep. School Dist. #112,'4 3 Cianflone lost his job as a teacher, and,
pursuant to Cianflone's contract, the termination issue proceeded to arbitration
where Cianflone's termination was upheld.4 ' On August 2, 1999, the arbitrator sent
a copy of the arbitration award to Cianflone's attorney, but Cianflone did not receive
a copy of the award by certified mail until February 1, 2000.45 On March 21, 2000,
Cianflone filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award with the district court.
4 6
The School District filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the motion to vacate was
time barred by the ninety day statute of limitations.48 7 Cianflone claimed that the
statute of limitations period did not begin to run until he received a copy of the
arbitration award by certified mail."8 The court granted the motion to dismiss
because Cianflone failed to file a motion to vacate within ninety days after his
attorney received a copy of the arbitration award.489
475. U.A.A § 12(b).
476. 548 S.E.2d 919 (Va. App. 2001).
477. Id. at 921.
478. Id. at 922.
479. Id.
480. Id.
481. Id. at 923. See Va. Code Ann., §§ 8.01-581.010 (1998). Id.
482. Id. at 925.
483. 2001 WL215711 (Minn. App. Mar. 6, 2001).
484. Id. at *1.
485. Id.
486. Id.
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The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in dismissing the
motion to vacate on statute of limitations grounds because the statute was tolled until
Cianflone received a copy of the arbitration award by certified mail .0 The UAA as
enacted in Minnesota states that an arbitrator shall deliver a copy of the award to
each party personally or by certified mail.49' Because Minnesota statute determined
the procedural requirements for motions to vacate arbitration awards, the statute of
limitations could not begin to run until the arbitration award was properly
delivered.49
Another Minnesota case addressed the issue of whether a motion to vacate an
arbitration award must be "filed" or "heard" within the ninety day statute of
limitations period. In Khawaja v. State Farm Ins. Co. ,49 an arbitration decision
determined that State Farm was not required to pay no-fault insurance benefits to
Khawaja following a car accident, where he settled the claim with a second
insurer.4" Khawaja then filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award.4" State Farm
acknowledged that the motion was filed within the ninety day statute of limitations
period as required by Minnesota statute, but claimed that the motion must be heard
within the ninety day period.4" The trial court dismissed State Farm's motion and
the company appealed.497
The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the statutory language of the
Minnesota version of the UAA should be interpreted to require the parties to file an
application to vacate an arbitration award within the ninety day time period, but the
motion did not have to be heard within the ninety day period.49' In dismissing State
Farm's claim, the Minnesota Court of Appeals followed the trend stating that
"motions are generally considered timely when they are filed within a prescribed
period of time." 4"
I. Judicial Review ofAmbiguous Terms in the Arbitration Award
The UAA allows reviewing courts to vacate awards if the arbitrator exceeds his
jurisdiction."' While this does not allow a court to substitute its determination of
law or fact into the place of the arbitrators, courts are given some discretion to
interpret ambiguous terms in an arbitration award or remand them back to the
arbitrator for clarification. 0 ' In Gen. Accident Ins. Co. ofAm. v. MSL Enter., Inc.," 2
the North Carolina Court of Appeals determined the amount of discretion a court has
in interpreting an arbitration award's ambiguous terms.0 3 In Gen. Accident Ins., an
insurance dispute arose between the parties, and arbitration proceedings were
initiated to resolve the conflict.5" The arbitrator issued an award in favor of General
490. Id. at *2.
491. Id. See Minn. Stat. § 572.15(a) (1998).
492. Id.
493. 631 N.W.2d 106 (Minn. App. 2001).
494. Id. at 107.
495. Id.
496. Id. at 112.
497. Id. at 108.
498. Id. at 112.
499. Id.
500. Fort Wayne Educ. Assn. v. Fort Wayne Community Sch., 73 N.E. 2d 672 (Ind. App. 2001).
501. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. ofAm. v. MLS Enter., Inc., 547 S.E.2d 97 (N.C. App. 2001).
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Id. at 98
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Accident Insurance, but the arbitrator's decision of who was included as "unpaid
vendors" was ambiguous. 5 MLS Enterprises subsequently filed a motion to vacate
the arbitration award." The trial court used its own interpretation of "unpaid
vendors," and granted summary judgment in favor of General Accident Insurance.5 7
On appeal, MLS Enterprises claimed that the trial court acted outside its jurisdiction
by interpreting the contract!0
The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment based on its own interpretation of the contract.o The Court
stated: "a court is permitted to interpret and enforce an ambiguous award if the
ambiguity can be resolved from the record., 51" However, in the case at hand, the
interpretation went straight "to the heart of the arbitrators' intent," and letting the
court make its own interpretation would allow the court to substitute its conclusions
of law for those of the arbitrator. 511 The court remanded the order to the arbitration
board for clarification, vacating the trial court's interpretation.
5 12
Fed. Signal Corp. v. SLC Tech.5" 3 is another case in which the trial court was
allowed to remand an arbitration award to the arbitrator for clarification." 4 In this
dispute over a distributor agreement, the arbitrator awarded SLC Technologies
("SLC") $230,000 in damages and reasonable attorney's fees.5"5 Federal Signal then
filed a motion to vacate the award of attorney's fees for incompleteness, because the
award of attorney's fees was not reduced to a specific amount." 6 SLC filed a motion
to compel arbitration to determine the amount of attorney's fees.5t ' The trial court
dismissed SLC's motion and vacated the award of attorney's fees."" SLC then
appealed to the Illinois Court of Appeals.519
The Illinois Court of Appeals held that the Illinois arbitration statute specifically
allowed a court to remand an issue to the arbitrator for clarification.520 The
application of this section of the UAA allows an arbitrator to revisit an arbitration
provision for clarification if an ambigous or missing term makes the award
incomplete. 21 Under this provision, SLC had ninety days to make an application to
the court to remand a case for clarification. 2





509. Id. at 99.
510. Id. at 100 (quoting Flender Corp. v. TechnaQuip Co., 953 F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir. 1992)). An
ambiguous arbitration award can be interpreted by the trial court if the record makes the arbitrators
intentions clear. However, if the courts interpretation would determine the overall outcome of the
arbitration, it is outside the courts jurisdiction to interpret the award. Id.
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. 743 N.E.2d 1066. (11). App. 2001).
514. Id. at 1074.
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J. Appealing an Order to Vacate an Arbitration Award
When an arbitration award is vacated under Section Twelve, a party may appeal
a final order of dismissal." InNebraska Department ofHealth andHuman Services
v. Struss,5 24 the Nebraska Supreme Court determined what constituted a final order
to vacate an arbitration award.5 25 The Nebraska Department of Health and Human
Services ("NDHHS") terminated Struss's employment and an arbitrator was called
upon to determine if the dismissal was appropriate. "6 The arbitrator heard the case,
found in favor of Struss, and reinstated him to his job. 27 NDHHS fied a motion to
vacate the arbitration award and the trial court granted the motion, remanding the
case for rehearing by a new arbitrator.528 Struss appealed the decision to the
Nebraska Court ofAppeals.529 However, the NDHHS then filed a motion to dismiss,
claiming that the court had no jurisdiction to decide the case. 3
The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that the Nebraska Court of Appeals had
no jurisdiction to hear the case.53 Nebraska's version of the UAA provides that an
order vacating an award without directing a rehearing may be appealed because it
signals the final termination of the arbitration process.532 However, "an order which
vacates an award and directs a rehearing is not appealable."533 Because the trial court
remanded the case to arbitration, the Nebraska Court of Appeals did not have
jurisdiction to decide the issue because the arbitration process was still continuing.534
VII. SECTION 13: MODIFICATION OR CORRECTION OF AWARD
Section Thirteen allows a court to modify or correct an award if application is
made within ninety days after delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant in
three situations: (1) where there was an evident miscalculation of figures or an
evident mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in an
award; (2) where the arbitrators awarded upon a matter not submitted to them and
the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the
issues submitted; or (3) where an award is imperfect in a matter of form, not
affecting the merits of the controversy."' If the application for modification or
correction is granted, then the court shall modify or correct the award so as to effect
its intent, and shall confirm the award as so modified and corrected, or the court shall
confirm the award as made.536 An application to vacate an award may be joined in
the alternative with an application to modify or correct an award.5 7
523. Nebraska Dept. of Health and Human Services v. Struss, 623 N.W. 2d 308 (Neb. App. 2001).
524. Id. at 308.
525. Id.
526. Id. at 310.
527. Id.
528. Id. at 31!.
529. Id.




534. Id. at 315.
535. U.A.A. § 13(a).
536. U.A.A. § 13(b).
537. U.A.A. § 13(c).
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In Dadak v. Commerce Ins. Co.,'" the court defined "evident miscalculation"
as used in Section Thirteen. The Dadak court found that the arbitrator's award did
not contain an evident miscalculation because the award stemmed from the
arbitrator's adoption of a particular substantive position.139  Therefore, the
application for modification was not granted. ° The court stated that the Superior
Courtjudge who found an "evident miscalculation" in the arbitrator's award mistook
the meaning of the statutory phrase. 41 The court stated that the "evident
miscalculation of figures" arises in the working out of mathematical terms of an
agreed or assumed standard or principle.542 In Dadak, the disagreement was about
the standard or principle itself (the interpretation of a clause), and the award reflected
the arbitrator's adoption of one interpretation of clause three in an automobile
insurance policy rather than the other interpretation." The court said that awards
so arrived at, whether perceived to be sensible or not, are impregnable short of fraud,
arbitrary conduct, or significant procedural irregularity."
In Drysdale Design Assoc. v. Frist, 5 the court denied an application for an
award to be vacated and modified, citing the exceedingly narrow standard of review
to challenge arbitrators' decisions.5 " In Frist, a contractor, Drysdale, brought an
action against the homeowners, Frists, seeking to overturn the district court's
decision not to vacate or modify an arbitration award rendered against Drysdale
relating to the renovation of the Frists' home.m' Drysdale complained that the
arbitrator impermissibly allowed the Frists to raise new allegations in their rebuttal
submissions without allowing Drysdale the opportunity to respond, thereby violating
the UAA as enacted in the District of Columbia. 5 Drysdale also complained that
the arbitrator adopted a new pricing formula which either contained an obvious
mathematical error, or was premised on evidence that the arbitrator could not have
considered unless he avoided violation of D.C. Code § 16-4311(4) by allowing
rebuttalYm9 The court denied that Drysdale had an inadequate opportunity to respond
to "new allegations" raised by the Frists, because each of the "new" items had been
the subject of previous testimony and exhibits produced by both sides during a
seven-day arbitration hearing.55 The court also rejected Drysdale's argument that
the arbitrator used the incorrect coefficient stating that "ambiguities present in the
record on this issue preclude us from finding that the arbitrator's choice of 1.4 as the
coefficient was 'an evident miscalculation of figures,' so as to fall within the
statutory grounds for correcting an arbitration award.
551
538. 758 N.E.2d 1083 (Mass. App. 2001).
539. Id. at 1086.
540. Id.
541. Id. at 1085.
542. Id.
543. Id. at 1084-85.
544. Id. at 1086, (citing Grobet File Co. of America, Inc. v. RTC Sys., Inc., 524 N.E.2d 404
(Mass.App. 1988)).
545. 2001 WL 1491350 (D.C.Cir. Oct. 31,2001).
546. Id. at * 1.
547. Id.
548. D.C. Code § 16-4311(4) (2001).
549. Frist, at * 1.
550. Id.
551. Id. at *2. See D.C. Code § 16-4312 (2001); Apex Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. United States Supply
Co., 142 F.3d 188, 194 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding, in construing the F.A.A., that the remedy of
modification of an "evident miscalculation offigures"could only apply to mathematical errors appearing
on the face of the award).
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In another case defining evident miscalculation of figures, Jones v. SummitLid.
Partn. Five,"5 2 the court found no evident miscalculation of figures and therefore
denied the application for modification. 53 Summit, a general contractor, hired Jones
to do painting and drywalling on a hotel owned by Summit?5 Sumniit was
dissatisfied with Jones' work and subsequently terminated its contractual relationship
with Jones.555 After Jones filed a construction lien against the hotel and a
construction lien foreclosure petition and praecipe in district court, the parties filed
a joint stipulation to arbitrate the dispute and agreed to stay the district court
proceedings pending an outcome in arbitration.116 Summit sought modification of
the arbitration award pursuant to Nebraska statute, which allows modification or
correction in the case of "evident miscalculation of figures." '57 In a case of first
impression, the court addressed what constitutes an "evident miscalculation of
figures" under § 25-2614(a)(1)."' The court looked to federal and state decisions
interpreting similar portions of the UAA and the FAA for guidance.53 9 The Nebraska
court looked at state courts and found that they similarly defined an "evident
miscalculation of figures" under the UAA.s60 The court was most persuaded by
Severtson v. Williams Cons. Co., 56 1 which stated an evident miscalculation is
"something which is apparent by an examination of the [document] needing no
evidence to make it more clear."' ' 2 The court concluded that under the UAA as
adopted by Nebraska, an "evident miscalculation of figures" occurred when there
was a mathematical error in the arbitration award that was both obvious and
unambiguous." 3
The Colorado Court of Appeals addressed the narrow standard of review trial
courts are to give an arbitration award in Duncan v. Natd. Home Ins. Co.564 The
Duncan court found that the trial court's modification of an arbitration award to
include prejudgment interest was impermissible because such was not requested
during arbitration. 5 The court stated that courts are limited on review to modify or
correct an arbitration award only upon statutory grounds, and may not review the
552. 635 N.W.2d 267 (Neb. 2001).
553. Id. at 271.
554. Id. at 268.
555. Id.
556. Id.
557. Id. at 269.
558. Id. at 270.
559. Id. The Eighth Circuit, for example, defined "evident material miscalculation of figures" under
9 U.S.C. § I I(a) of the FAA as a "mathematical mistake." Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus. Inc.,
785 F.2d 743,749 (8th Cir. 1986). The Fifth and Sixth Circuits held that evident material miscalculation
occurs only where the record before the arbitrator demonstrates an unambiguous and undisputed mistake
of fact in making the award. Mcllroy v. PaineWebber, Inc., 989 F.2d 817, 821 (5th Cir. 1993); Nat!.
Post Off. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 751F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1985). The Fourth Circuit held that "evident
material miscalculation" is a mathematical error appearing on the face of the award. Apex Plumbing
Supply v. US. Supply Co., 142 F.3d 188, 194 (4th Cir. 1995).
560. Id. See e.g. Foust v. Aetna Cas. & Ins. Co., 786 P.2d 450 (Colo. App. 1989) (stating that only
mathematical errors that do not alter award on merits); Fashion Exhibitors v. Gunter, 41 N.C. App. 407,
413; 255 S.E.2d 414, 419 (1979) (stating that "mathematical errors committed by arbitrators which
would be patently clear to a reviewing court").
561. 173 Cal. App. 3d 86 (1985).
562. Jones. 635 N.W.2d at 270.
563. Id. at 271.
564. 36 P.3d 191 (Colo. App. 2001).
565. Id. at 192-93.
[Vol. 2002, No. 2
42
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2002, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2002/iss2/9
Recent Developments: UAA
merits of the arbitrator's decision.5s Therefore, the trial court is limited to granting
"an order confirming, modifying, or correcting an award, judgment or decree
[which] shall be entered in conformity therewith and be enforced as any other
judgment or decree." '567 After reviewing cases from other jurisdictions, the court
concluded that the addition of prejudgment interest upon confirmation of an
arbitration award is an impermissible modification of the award.5 6' The arbitration
award in this case stated that it was "in full settlement of all claims submitted to this
arbitration. ' 69  This statement, along with authority from other jurisdictions,
precluded the trial court from awarding prejudgment interest."'
The narrow standard of review was applied in Sherman v. Amica Mutual Ins.
Co.571 where the court denied a petition to modify, correct, or vacate an arbitration
award.57 The appellants filed the petition alleging a mistake of law and demanding
review pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7302(d)(2).573 Pennsylvania's version of the
UAA 574 provides similar standards for review of an arbitration decision as the
UAA.575 In more limited circumstances, the Pennsylvania statute also provides a
second standard of review for the review of statutory arbitration claims, stating: "a
court in reviewing an arbitration award shall modify or correct the award where the
award is contrary to law, and is such that had it been a verdict of a jury the court
would have entered a different judgment or a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict." '576 However, a historical footnote accompanying § 7302 provides only two
types of agreements for which this standard is applicable: 1) an agreement made
prior to the effective date of this act which expressly provides that it be interpreted
pursuant to the law of this Commonwealth and which expressly provides for
statutory arbitration; and 2) an agreement heretofore or hereafter made which
expressly provides for arbitration pursuant to the former provisions of the Act of
April 25, 1927 (P.L. 381, No. 248), relating to statutory arbitration. 77 The court
found that neither of the conditions in § 7302 applied to the insurance policy, so §§
7314 and 7315 were applicable to the instant case.178 Sections 7314 and 7315 do not
allow review under a "contrary to law" standard and the court affirmed the judgment
below, denying appellant's request to modify, correct, or vacate the arbitration
award. 79
566. Id. at 192. SeeMcNaughton & Rodgers v. Besser, 932 P.2d 819,822 (Colo. App. 1996)("In the
absence of appropriate grounds to modify, vacate, or correct an award, a trial court is required to affirm
the amount without review of the merits."); Judd Constr. Co. v. Evans Joint Venture, 642 P.2d 922,924
(Colo. 1982)(stating that the role of the court in considering an arbitrator's award is strictly limited,
which is in conformity with the Arbitration Act and the significance of an arbitration award).
567. Id. See § 13-22-216, C.R.S. 2001; Judd Construction Co., 642 P.2d at 925.
568. Id. at 192-93. See Ebasco Constructors, Inc. v. Ahtna, Inc., 932 P.2d 1312 (Alaska
1997)(holding that arbitrators and not trial courts determine the availability of prejudgement interests
on arbitration awards); see e.g. Creative Builders v. Avenue Developments, Inc., 715 P.2d 308 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1986); Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 1168 (Idaho 1996); Mausbach v. Lemke, 866 P.2d
1146 (Nev. 1994); Palmer v. Duke Power Co.. 499 S.E.2d 801 (N.C. App. 1998).
569. Id. at 193.
570. Id.
571. 782 A.2d 1006 (Pa. Super. 2001). For full account of the facts, see supra n. 428
572. Id. at 1007.
573. Id.
574. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 7301 et. seq.
575. Sherman, 782 A.2d at 1007-1008.
576. Id. at 1008-1009 (citing 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 7302).
577. Id. at 1009 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7302 (historical footnote)).
578. Id.
579. Id. at 1010.
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In Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Taylor, s° the court denied an insurer's petition to
modify or correct an arbitration award citing the narrow standard of review.5 " The
insurer contended that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in that: "1) the arbitration
clause did not empower the arbitrator to determine the amount of payment the
insured was to receive from the insurer under the underinsured motorist coverage;
2) the arbitrator impermissibly awarded the insured damages against the insurer; 3)
the award, including the prejudgment interest, impermissibly [exceeded] the
applicable policy limit; and 4) the arbitrator failed to subtract [the amounts the
insured received from the tortfeasor and her daughter's insurer from the
damages.]" ' The court noted that Colorado has adopted the UAA 5" to give a
uniform statutory framework for arbitration and to encourage settlement of disputes
through the arbitration process. 58 The court stated that the role of the courts in
evaluating an arbitration award is strictly limited, and the arbitrator is the final judge
of both fact and law. 5 ' The court found that the language of the arbitration
provision unambiguously empowered the arbitrator to determine the amount of
underinsured motorist benefits payable to the insured under the terms of the
policy.' 6 Additionally, the court stated that the parties to an arbitration have an
absolute right to be heard and present evidence before the arbitrator, and to have a
fair opportunity to rebut evidence and arguments presentedby the opposing party."8 7
The parties to an arbitration are obligated to present all relevant arguments, defenses,
and evidence during the arbitration because judicial review of an arbitration award
is limited by the presumption of finality."' The court found that there was nothing
in the record to indicate that the insurer advised the arbitrator at the hearing that any
award would be subject to policy limits and setoffs, affirmative defenses to the
insurer's obligation to pay benefits to the insured.8 9
In another recent case addressing the narrow standard of review, Sportsman's
Quikstop I, Ltd., v. Didonato, the court denied modification of an arbitration award
because of failure to comply with procedural requirements. 9 ' The court noted that
"[tihe sole bases for vacating, modifying, or correcting an arbitration award are set
forth in Sections 13-22-214(1) and 13-22-215(1), C.R.S. 2000." '  Both sections
"require that an application seeking such relief be made 'within thirty days after
delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant." 593 The court stated that "[f]ailure
to comply with the UAA's special statutory procedure for challenging an arbitration
award on its merits or the power of arbitrators to make an award bars any such
580. 45 P.3d 759 (Colo. App. 2001). For full account of facts, see supra n. 214
581. Id. at 761.
582. Id.
583. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-22-201 to 223 (2000).
584. Taylor, 45 P.3d at 761.
585. Id. see Judd Construction Co. v. Evans Joint Venture, 642 P.2d 922, 924-926 (Colo. 1982).
586. Taylor, 45 P.3d at 762.
587. Id.: see Dodge City, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 41, 43 (Colo. App. 1989).
588. Id. (referring to Fisher v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 749, 752
which states that where a party failed to produce evidence at arbitration on an issue properly before the
arbitrator pursuant to a broad arbitration agreement, that party cannot subsequently seek modification
if the only reason for the erroneous award is that party's failure to produce evidence on the issue).
589. Id. at 762-63.
590. 32 P.3d 633 (Colo. App. 2001).
591. Id. at 635.
592. Id. at 634. See Foust v. Aetna Cas. & Ins. Co., 786 P.2d 450,451 (Colo. App. 1989) (identifying
the Colorado Statutes as the basis for reviewing the arbitration award).
593. Didonato, 32 P.3d at 634.
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objection to the award in a confirmation proceeding." '594 In this case, the response
was filed fifty-five days after the defendant received a copy of the award; thus, the
defendant failed to timely follow the procedures set forth in the UAA for modifying,
correcting, or vacating the award.5 95 Because of such failure, the defendant was
barred from presenting substantive defenses in response to plaintiffs motion.
5 6
In a recent case about the narrow standard of review and clarification of
ambiguity in arbitration awards, the court in General Accident Ins. Co. ofAmerica
v. MSL Enter., Inc.5 97 addressed a fundamental first-impression issue: "[h]ow may
a party seek to clarify an ambiguous term in an arbitration award that had been
confirmed under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-567.12 (1999), following the expiration of the
statutorily-prescribed period for vacating the award, or modifying or correcting the
award. ' 's9s The ambiguity at issue was whether General Accident was an unpaid
"vendor" within the meaning of the arbitration award.-" The court stated that when
deciding whether to modify or correct an award for one of the statutorily-enumerated
reasons, it shall do so to effectuate the arbitrators' intent.6m "[T]he legislative intent
is that only awards reflecting mathematical errors, errors relating to form, and errors
resulting from arbitrators exceeding their authority shall be modified or corrected by
the reviewing courts."'" "Courts are not to modify or correct matters affecting the
merits which reflect the intent of the arbitrators."'6 The court concluded that the
trial court's interpretation of the term "vendors" went to the heart of the arbitrators'
intent and was impermissible. °3 The court looked to In re Boyte' as authority on
the issue of first impression.6°5 In Boyte, the court recognized the trial court's
authority under the UAA to remand an arbitration award to the arbitration panel for
clarification in certain circumstances.' The court concluded that N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 1-567.10 (1996) granted authority to the trial court to remand an ambiguous award
for clarification. 7 However, the court never confronted or addressed the issue "of
whether a trial court may remand an arbitration award for clarification when: (1)
there were not motions before the court for the confirmation, clarification, or
modification of the award, and the time within which to file such motions has
expired, and (2) the confirmation of the award has been upheld on appeal." 601
594. Id. (citing Kutch v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 960 P.2d 93, 97 (Colo. 1998)).
595. Id. at 634-35.
596. Id. at 635. See Kutch, 960 P.2d at 99 (defending a similar holding "in order to
preserve the integrity of the Uniform Arbitration Act's statutory framework.").
597. 547 S.E.2d 97 (N.C. App. 2001). For full account of the facts, see supra nn. 501-12.
598. GeneralAccident, 547 S.E.2d at 99. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1.567.13 to .14 (1999).
599. Id. at 98.
600. Id.
601. Id.
602. Id. at 98-99 (citing Carolina Virginia Fashion Exhibitors, Inc., v. Gunter, 255 S.E,2d 414, 419
(N.C. App. 1979)).
603. Id. at 99.
604. Boyte v. Dickson, 303 S.E.2d 418 (N.C. App. 1983).
605. GeneralAccident, 547 S.E.2d at 99.
606. Id.
607. Boyte, 303 S.E.2d at 421 (citing to the following cases: Accord Borough of Dunmore v.
Dunmore Police Dep "t., 526 A.2d 1250 (Pa. Cmmw. 1987); McIntosh v. State Farm Fire and Casualty
Co., 625 A.2d 63 (Pa. Super. 1993); HE. Sargent. Inc., v. Town of Millinocket, 478 A.2d 683 (Me.
1984); Weiss v. Metalsalts Corp., 222 N.Y.2d 7 (1961); University ofAlaska v. Modern Constr.. Inc.,
522 P.2d 1132 (Alaska 1974); FederalSignal Corp. V. SLC Techs., Inc., 743 N.E.2d 1066 (Ill. App.3d
2001); see generally Gibbs v. Douglas M. Grimes, P.C., 491 N.E.2d 1004 (Ill. App. 3d 1986) (stating
that,a reviewing court may remand an award to the arbitrator for clarification in exceptional
circumstances, which usually involve vagueness)).
608. General Accident, 547 S.E.2d at 99.
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"Instead, '[i]f an award is unclear, it should be sent back to the arbitrator for
clarification. ""o' "Because 'remand for clarification is a disfavored procedure,'6 "
where possible, 'a court should avoid remanding a decision to the arbitrator because
of the interest in prompt and final arbitration.'"6" The court, in Flender, held that
"a court is permitted to interpret and enforce an ambiguous award if the ambiguity
can be resolved from the record.' t2 In other words, where an ambiguity is resolved
by the record, the district court does not need to remand for clarification. However,
where the ambiguity is not resolved by the record, the district court may not interpret
the term, and must remand the matter to the arbitration panel for clarification.613 The
court also looked to Office & Prof'l Employees Int'l Union v. Brownsville Gen.
Hosp.,6 14 where the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that
in the case of ambiguity in an award, any attempt by the court "to divine the intent
of the arbitrator [is] a perilous endeavor.""" The Pennsylvania court asserted that
a remand to the arbitrator avoids misinterpretation of the award by the court, and is
more likely to result in the award for which the parties bargained. 61 '
In GeneralAccident, the court stated that it found it "both ironic and unfortunate
that arbitration, a process designed to accomplish the peaceful and speedy resolution
of disputes, should have devolved into the bitter impasse before us."6' 7 The General
Accident court concluded that when the trial court is asked to interpret an ambiguous
term in an arbitration award, such matters may be determined by the trial court only
where the ambiguity may be resolved from the record."8s However, in disputes like
"the instant case, where the ambiguity is not resolved by the record, the only proper
[way] to resolve the dispute is to remand the matter to the arbitration panel for
clarification of the [disputed] term."'' The North Carolina Court of Appeals stated
that upon remand, "the arbitration panel must limit its review to a clarification of the
meaning of the word 'vendors' in the award."'20
In Bensalem Township Police Benevolent Assoc., Inc. v. Bensalem Township,62'
the court addressed the issue of whether failing to strictly comply with notice
requirements of the UAA as enacted in Pennsylvania 2  prevented the "Board of
Arbitrators from exercising its jurisdiction to modify or correct an award."'2
Section 73 11 (b) requires "the party seeking reconsideration to provide written notice
'to all other parties stating that they must serve objections thereto within ten days
from the date of notice. "6 24 "This court previously waived strict conformance to the
609. Id. at 100 (quoting Flender, 953 F.2d at 279-80).
610. Flender, 953 F.2d at 280.
611. Teamsters LocalNo. 579 v. B & M Transit, Inc., 882 F.2d 274,278 (7th Cir. 1989); see Tri-State,
221 F.3d at 1017 (citing to Teamsters as well in order to be "mindful of several principles governing
judicial consideration of such awards.").
612. General Accident, 547 S.E.2d at 100 (quoting Flender, 953 F.2d at 280)
613. Id. (citing Tri-State, 221 F.3d at 1019-20).
614 . 186 F.3d 326 (3d Cir. 1999).
615. d. at333
616. Id (citing ColonialPenn. Ins. Co. v. Omaha Indem. Co., 943 F.2d 327, 334 (3d Cir. 1991)).
617. GeneralAccident, 547 S.E.2d at 101 (quoting Brownsville Gen. Hosp., 186 F.3d at 328).
618. Id. See Tri-State, 221 F.3d at 1017.
619. General Accident, 547 S.E.2d at 100.
620. Id.
621. 777 A.2d 1174 (Pa. Cmmw. 2001).
622. 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 7311 (b).
623. Bensalem, 777 A.2d at 1177.
624. Id. (citing 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 731 1(b)).
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notice provisions under the [UAA]." 62 The court found "no evidence that PBA was
prejudiced by the Township's failure to inform the PBA that it had ten days to file
objections to the Township's application for reconsideration." 26 Therefore, the
court held that the Board had jurisdiction under § 731 1(b) to change the arbitration
award.s27
An Illinois court recently addressed remanding an ambiguous arbitration award.
InExcavating, Grading, Asphalt, Private Scavengers, Automobile Salesroom Garage
Attendants, linen and Laundry Drivers, Local 731 v. A. W. Zengeler Cleaners, Inc.,628
modification of an arbitration award was ordered by the district court because it
could not enforce an ambiguous award in which the record did not clarify the
ambiguity.6 9 The Illinois court stated that judicial review of an arbitration award is
limited, and "[a] district court has no authority to substitute its judgment for the
judgment of an arbitrator."6 30 While remanding an arbitration award back to the
arbitrator for clarification should be used sparingly, a district court cannot enforce
an ambiguous award.63' According to the court, the proper procedure for a court
when confronted with an ambiguity that cannot be resolved on the record is to send
the award back to the arbitrator for clarification.
63 2
In D & E Constr. Co., Inc. v. Robert J. Denley Co, Ins.,633 the court discussed
the limited clearly erroneous standard of review which they were to apply to the
case.6 4 The court found that the arbitrator exceeded his authority when he awarded
attorney's fees, because such was not within the scope of the contract's arbitration
provision. -' Tennessee applied its version of the UAA636 and vacated the award.637
The court stated that modification or correction of an arbitration award is appropriate
when "[tihe arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them and the
award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues
submitted.' ' 3s
VIII. SECTION 17: COURT, JURISDICTION
Section Seventeen of the UAA defines "court" as any court of competent
jurisdiction.639 Jurisdiction is conferred on the trial court to enforce an agreement
625. Id. See Big Beaver Falls Area Sch. Dist. v. Big Beaver Falls Educ. Ass'n, 492 A.2d 87, 88-89
(Pa. Cmmw. 1985) (holding improper mode of service under § 7317 will not divest trial court
jurisdiction when a party acts in good faith to notify the other party and "refrained from a course of
conduct serving to stall the legal machinery"); see generally Nagy v. Upper Yoder Township, 652 A.2d
428, 430 (Pa. Cmmw. 1994) ("[P]laintiffs have been found to exercise good faith when the defendant
has received notice, albeit defective notice").
626. Bensalem, 777 A.2d at 1178.
627. Id.
628. 2001 WL 138932 (N.D.Ill. 2001). For the full account of this case, see supra nn. 266-74.
629. Id. at 3.
630. Id. See Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, 768 F.2d 180,183-84 (7th Cir. 1985).
631. Excavating, 2001 WL 138932 at 3. "It is well-settled that a district court generally may not
interpret an ambiguous arbitration award" Id. (quoting Tri-State, 221 F.3d at 1017 (quoting Flender
Corp. v. Techna-Quip. Co., 953 F.2d 273, 279 (7th Cir. 1992))).
632. Id.
633. 38 S.W.3d 513 (Tenn. 2001). See supra nn. 378-85 for a full account of the facts in this case.
634. Id. at 518. See Arnold v. Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc., 914 S.W.2d 445, 450 (Tenn. 1996).
635. D&E, 38 S.W.3d at 517.
636. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-5-301 to 320 (2000).
637. D& E, 38 S.W.3d at 521.
638. Id. at 518 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-313(a)(3)).
639. U.A.A. § 17.
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under the UAA, and to enter judgment on an arbitration award pursuant to the
making of arbitration agreements as provided in Section One of the UAA."'"
A. Jurisdiction for Reconsideration and Questions of Mootness
In Bensalem Township," a dispute arose regarding negotiations for a new
collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between Bensalem Township
("Township") and Bensalem Township Police Benevolent Association, Inc.
("PBA"). 642 The Township and PBA submitted the disputed issues to a board of
arbitrators ("Board") who resolved the issues in dispute, and handed down an award
that was delivered to each of the arbitrators for their signature." 3 Within ten days
of the delivery of the award, the Township requested that the Board modify or
correct the award pursuant to Pennsylvania's adaptation of the UAA.' The PBA
subsequently filed a protective petition with the Bucks County Court of Common
Pleas seeking to change the duration of the award." 5 In response, the Township filed
preliminary objections to the PBA's petition, maintaining that the trial court did not
have jurisdiction to review the petition."6  The Township's "basis for this
jurisdictional challenge was that they had already filed a timely application to the
Board for modification or correction of the award", and that the PBA had
acknowledged the issue was already before the Board.! 7 The Board then issued a
"supplemental award" to address the issues raised by the Township while the matter
was pending before the trial court." As a result, the trial court dismissed PBA's
petition as moot, and determined that if the PBA was dissatisfied with the Board's
modified award, the PBA should have filed a petition to vacate or a petition to
correct the modified supplemental award." 9 The PBA then appealed the trial court's
decision.650
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania first addressed whether the Board
had jurisdiction to correct the initial award.65" ' Under Pennsylvania law, a party
seeking reconsideration of an arbitrator's award "must provide written notice to all
other parties stating that they must serve objections thereto within ten days from the
date of the notice. 65 2 Thus the court had to determine whether failing to strictly
conform to the notice requirements found in the UAA as enacted in Pennsylvania
prevented a board of arbitrators from exercising jurisdiction to modify or correct an
award.65 3 The court stated that determination of whether defects in notice
requirements were fatal must address both the timeliness and content of the notice.6
640. Id.
641. Bensalem Township Police Benevolent Assn., Inc., 777 A.2d 1174.
642. Id. at 1175.
643. Id.
644. Id.
645. Id. at 1176.
646. Id.
647. Id.




652. Id. at 1177 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 7311 (b) (2002).
653. Id.
654. Id.
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The court concluded that the Township's arbitrators gave notice to the PBA within
nine days of the award, making the notice given timely.655
The Commonwealth Court then addressed the content requirements of notice,
and stated the general rule that if notice is timely provided, "failure to comply with
the content requirements of notice will not necessarily preclude jurisdiction. '65 6 The
court concluded that while the Township did not comply with the technical notice
requirements, there was no evidence of the PBA being prejudiced by the Township's
failure to inform the PBA that they had ten days to file objections to the Township's
application for reconsideration.657 Therefore because of the defective content of the
Township's notice of application to the PBA, the Board did not prejudice the PBA,
and the Board had jurisdiction under Pennsylvania law to change the award.65
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania next addressed the question of
mootness." 9  The general rule regarding mootness is that an actual case or
controversy must exist at all stages of appellate review, and "where intervening
changes in the factual matrix of a pending case" occur eliminating actual controversy
and making it impossible for a court to grant the relief requested, the case will be
dismissed as moot."0 Following the general rules, the court affirmed the trial court's
decision and held that the Board's modification of the initial award and issuance of
a supplementary award made the PBA's petition moot."'
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In Artrip v. Samons Construction, Inc.,66 Artrip and Samons Construction
("Samons") executed an agreement for the construction of an addition to Artrip's
business, which included a provision that all disputes be arbitrated." 3 A dispute
arose concerning the work done by Samons, and Artrip filed a complaint in the Boyd
Circuit Court."0 An agreed order "placed the action in abeyance pending arbitration
of the dispute." ' Arbitration proceedings commenced in Cincinnati, Ohio, and
Samons was awarded monies for amounts due under the contract.6" Samons
subsequently filed a motion in the Boyd Circuit Court seeking a judgment
confirming the arbitrator's award, and Artrip moved to vacate the award as being
"grossly deviant from applicable law."" 7 The portion of the award denying Artrip
recovery was vacated by the court and resubmitted to arbitration, but Artrip was once
again unsuccessful in his claim for damages."8 Following the second arbitration
655. Id. The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania stated that in previous cases they have waived
strict compliance to notice provisions under the U.A.A. and proceeded in the instant case under the




658. Id. at 1178.
659. Id.
660. Id. Pennsylvania law states that petitions for review ofan arbitrator's award are to be considered
an appeal to the trial court. Id.; see Pa.C.S. § 933(b).
661. Id. at 1179.
662. 54 S.W.3d 169 (Ky. App. 2001).
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proceeding, Sarnons filed a renewed petition for confirmation of the arbitrator's
award and entry of judgment in their favor.69 Artrip argued that the court lacked
jurisdiction to enforce the arbitrator's award since it was rendered in Ohio. 670
The Kentucky Court of Appeals began by stating that Kentucky courts have
jurisdiction to confirm awards procured through arbitration where the parties'
agreement provided for the arbitration itself to be within Kentucky. 67' The Kentucky
Court of Appeals went on to state that the court's jurisdiction to enforce an award
is governed by the UAA as enacted in Kentucky, and not statutes and constitutional
provisions that delineate general circuit court subject matter jurisdiction for other
matters.67 2 Because Kentucky statute dictates that an arbitration agreement must
provide for the arbitration itself to be in Kentucky to confer subject matter
jurisdiction on a Kentucky court,673 the Artrip court held that the intervening
arbitration severed the circuit court's original jurisdiction over the matter because
the parties to the agreement failed to designate that the arbitration was to take place
in Kentucky.674 Failure to designate Kentucky as the locus of the arbitration
proceeding in the original agreement prevented the parties from invoking the
jurisdiction of Kentucky courts to enforce a subsequent arbitration award.6"
IX. SECTION 19: APPEALS
Section Nineteen addresses appeals of arbitration decisions. 676 There are six
situations in which an appeal may be taken: (1) an order denying an application to
compel arbitration made under Section Two; (2) an order granting an application to
stay arbitration made under Section Two(b); (3) an order confirming or denying
confirmation of an award; (4) an order modifying or correcting an award; (5) an
order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or (6) a judgment or decree
entered pursuant to the provisions of the UAA. 6"
In Fedie v Mid-Century Ins. Co.,678 the court held that an order compelling
arbitration is not appealable.6 7 9 After the district court entered an order confirnming
the arbitration award, Mid-Century alleged that the district court "abused its
discretion by allowing respondent Fedie to amend her complaint to request
mandatory arbitration of her claim for underinsured motorist benefits," and by
ordering the parties to arbitration. 60  Fedie argued that Mid-Century's failure to
669. Id.
670. Id.
671. Id. at 171 (citing Tru Green Corp. v. Sampson, 802 S.W.2d 951, 953 (Ky.App. 1991)).
672. Id. (citing Tru Green, 802 S.W.2d at 953).
673. Id. at 172. The Kentucky Court of Appeals stated that it is after this initial inquiry that Kentucky
statutes and the Kentucky Constitution are referenced to determine whether the circuit court is the "court
of competent jurisdiction." Id.
674. Id.
675. Id. at 173. The Kentucky Court of Appeals noted that other jurisdictions have held that where
an arbitration agreement does not specifically provide for the location of the arbitration, a state's
prerequisites for subject matter jurisdiction under the UAA are satisfied if arbitration could have taken
place in that state. Id. In these jurisdictions, courts have held that the state court had jurisdiction to
enforce the arbitrator's award since the arbitration had actually taken place in state. Id. However, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals was unable to find a case with facts similar to those in Artrip holding that
a court has subject matter jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration award. Id.
676. U.A.A. § 19.
677. U.A.A. § 19(a).
678. 631 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. App. 2001).
679. Id. at 818.
680. Id. at 817.
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appeal the order compelling arbitration precluded appeal.6"' Mid-Century relied on
County ofHennepin v. Ada-Bec Sys. 682 for the proposition that an order compelling
arbitration is appealable.6"3 Ada-Bec involved an appeal from a denial of a motion
to stay court proceedings pending arbitration.6 4 In Ada-Bec, the Minnesota Court
of Appeals noted that the UAA as adopted in Minnesota provided for appeal from
an order denying an application to compel arbitration.6 5 The court there found that
"[b]ecause this order effectively operates as a denial of arbitration, it is the finctional
equivalent of an order to compel arbitration and is appealable. 686 The Fedie court
stated that although the wording of Ada-Bec implies that an order compelling
arbitration is appealable, "it is clear from the context of the statement and the facts
of the case that this court was relying on statutory language that makes an order
denying an application to compel arbitration appealable."687 The court added that the
implication that an order to compel arbitration is appealable was dictum, and no right
of appeal was created. 8
The court stated that because no statute or case law makes an order to compel
arbitration appealable, Mid-Century did not waive its right to appeal by failing to
appeal from the order compelling arbitration.689 Furthermore, the record supported
the district court's finding that Mid-Century would not suffer any prejudice by
allowing Fedie to amend her complaint. 6 °
In J.P. Meyer Trucking and Constr., Inc. v. Co. Sch. Dist. Self Ins. Pool,69' the
Colorado Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the UAA authorizes an
interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss.692 InJ.P. Meyer, a dump
truck owned by J.P. Meyer rear-ended a school bus owned by the Denver School
District No. 1, a member of the Colorado School Districts Self Insurance Pool.
693
The Pool paid personal injury protection ("PIP") benefits to the injured passengers
and then filed a direct action against J.P. Meyer pursuant to section 10-4-713(2)(a),
5 Colorado Revised Statutes ("C.R.S.") (2000) of the No Fault Act for
reimbursement of all PIP benefits paid to the injured bus riders. 694 J.P. Meyers
moved to dismiss the action, and the trial court granted the motion.695 The Pool
appealed the dismissal, and the court of appeals reversed, vacating the trial court
order dismissing the case.6  On remand, J.P. Meyer renewed its motion to dismiss
the complaint, asserting that the Pool is an "insurer licensed to write motor vehicle
insurance," and therefore is required to arbitrate any dispute under section 10-4-717
681. Id.
682. 394 N.W.2d 611 (Minn. App. 1986).
683. Fedie, 631 N.W.2d at 818.
684. Ada-Bec, 394 N.W.2d at 613.
685. Id. (citing Minn. Stat. § 572.09(a) (1984), now codified at Minn. Stat. § 572.26, subd.1 (2000)
(listing appealable orders, not including orders to compel arbitration)).
686. Id.
687. Fedie, 631 N.W.2d at 818.
688. Id. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03 (listing whichjudgments and orders are appealable); Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 103.030) (indicating appeal may be taken from such other orders or decisions as may
be appealable by statute or under decisions of the Minnesota appellate courts).
689. Id. at 818-19.
690. Id. at 817
691. 18 P.3d 198 (Colo. 2001) (en banc).
692. Id. at 201.
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of the No Fault Act.6' The trial court denied J.P. Meyer's motion without citing
reasons for its decision, but the order was not made final pursuant to Colorado Rules
of Civil Procedure ("C.R.C.P.") 54(b). 98
J.P. Meyer filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Colorado Rule of Appellate
Procedure ("C.A.R.") 3, stating that the court of appeals had jurisdiction in this case
because, although not a final order, the denial of the motion to dismiss was
"tantamount to the denial of a motion to enforce arbitration under an agreement to
arbitrate [and therefore] a final appealable order pursuant to § 13-22-221."6" At the
same time, J.P. Meyer filed a petition for a writ of prohibition under C.A.R. 21,
requesting that the court exercise its original jurisdiction to prevent the trial court
from proceeding.W The trial court declined to issue a rule to show cause, but the
court of appeals accepted the case on appeal."0 The court of appeals noted the
absence of a final order and that the No Fault Act does not authorize interlocutory
appeals.7' The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that it had jurisdiction under
section 13-22-221(l)(a) of the UAA, which provides that denial of a motion to
compel arbitration is an appealable order.7 3 The court stated that the trial court's
denial of J.P. Meyer's motion to dismiss was equivalent to the denial of a motion to
compel arbitration.7°4 After concluding it had jurisdiction to review the matter, the
Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's denial of J.P. Meyer's motion to
dismiss,75 finding that the Pool was not an insurer licensed to write motor vehicle
insurance in Colorado "within the meaning of section 10-4-717, and was therefore
not subject to the arbitration provisions of that section.""
The Colorado Supreme Court had never previously addressed whether section
13-22-221(1)(a) authorized an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to
dismiss based on an allegations that the dispute should be resolved by arbitration. 7°
The Colorado Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals' finding that it had
jurisdiction, because the denial of J.P. Meyer's motion to dismiss was the equivalent
of a denial of a motion to compel arbitration.00 The Colorado Supreme Court stated
that the plain language of the UAA did not provide for interlocutory appellate
jurisdiction in this case, because the language clearly required either a written
arbitration agreement or a contractual arbitration provision, neither of which existed
in the case. 709 The court further noted that the plain language of the UAA clearly
provides for an appeal only after a motion to compel arbitration under section 13-22-
204 has been denied.710 J.P. Meyer filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to C.R.C.P.
12; J.P. Meyer did not seek to compel arbitration pursuant to section 13-22-204. "
697. Id.
698. Id.






705. Id. at 201.
706. Id. at 200.
707. Id. at 201. See Hughley v. Rocky Mtn. Health Maint. Org., 927 P.2d 1325,1329n.8 (Colo. 1996)
(noting that "[b]y our judgment today we do not address whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction
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